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A COMPUTATIONAL ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL POLARIZATION
David E. Pozen,t Eric L. Talleytt & Julian Nyarkotft
This Article is the first to use computational methods to
investigate the ideologicaland partisanstructure of constitutional discourse outside the courts. We apply a range of machine-learning and text-analysis techniques to a newly
available data set comprising all remarks made on the U.S.
House and Senate floors from 1873 to 2016, as well as a
collection of more recent newspaper editorials. Among other
findings, we demonstrate (1) that constitutionaldiscourse has
grown increasinglypolarized over the pastfour decades; (2)
that polarizationhas grown faster in constitutionaldiscourse
than in nonconstitutlonaldiscourse; (3) that conservative-leaning speakers have driven this trend, (4) that members of Congress whose politicalparty does not control the presidency or
their own chamber are significantly more likely to invoke the
Constitutionin some, but not all, contexts; and (5) that contemporary conservative legislators have developed an especially
coherent constitutional vocabulary, with which they have
come to "own" not only terms associatedwith the document's
originalmeaning but also terms associatedwith textual provisions such as the FirstAmendment. Above and beyond these
concrete contributions, this Article demonstrates the potential
for computational methods to advance the study of constitutional history, politics, and culture.
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INTRODUCTION

The United States Constitution says nothing about political parties.' The political parties, however, routinely say things
about the Constitution. Ever since the Founding, appeals to
the canonical text by elected officials and other actors in the
party networks have helped to shape policy debates, define
public values, and advance competing visions of the nation.2
I

See Nathaniel Persily, Toward a FinctionalDefense of PoliticalParty Auton-

omy, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 750, 813 (2001) ("Political parties are absent from the
constitutional text. . . ."); see also Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REv. 2312, 2320 (2006) ("The idea of

political parties ...
was famously anathema to the Framers .... ").
2 A vast literature touches on these themes. Recent intellectual and political
histories of constitutional discourse beyond the courts include ANDREW E. BUSCH,
CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE AND AMERICAN GOvERNMENT

(2008), https://www.heri

tage.org/the-constitution/report/constitutional-discourse-and-american-gov-
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'The written Constitution," according to one familiar formulation, supplies a highly salient "'common ground' for all Americans" and thus "a 'focal point' for social coordination" and
contestation. 3 Within certain domains, "constitutional discourse has come to constitute the terms of political discourse."4 For students of American law, politics, and culture,
understanding the partisan dimensions and historical evolution of constitutional discourse is of immense interest.
A persistent challenge for scholarship on this subject is
that appeals to the Constitution in public life are so common
that it is all but impossible to gain anything approximating a
systematic or synoptic grasp of them using traditional methods
of legal research. Case studies can provide insight, but they
necessarily cover only a small fraction of the terrain. In this
Article, we marshal computational methods to address this
challenge and illuminate the anatomy of extrajudicial constitutional debate. Applying a range of machine-learning and textanalysis techniques to a newly available data set comprising all
remarks made on the U.S. House and Senate floors from 1873
to 2016, as well as a collection of New York Times and Wall
Street Journaleditorials from 1993 to 2018, we explore broadly
how the constitutional utterances of different partisan and ideological camps have evolved in comparison with one another.5
ernment [https://perma.cc/Q8FL-2E4C];

PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY:

SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (1992); MICHAEL KAMMEN,
SOVEREIGNTY AND LIBERIY: CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1988);

Ken I. Kersch, The Talking Cure: How ConstitutionalArgument Drives Constitutional Development, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1083 (2014).
3 Akhil Reed Amar, American Constitutionalism-Written,Unwritten, and Living, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 195, 197 (2013); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (noting that the Constitution was meant to be a

populist document, "understood by the public," rather than a technocratic "legal
code"); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitutionfrom a Social
Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 322 (2001) ("[Oifficial pronouncements about the meaning of the Constitution elicit special forms of engagement

from citizens and so become a focal point of normative contestation."); David A.
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877,
910-19 (1996) (arguing that the written Constitution serves as a "focal point" for
coordinating behavior).
4 Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and
Homosexuality, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 521, 538 (1989); cf Bruce A. Ackerman, The
Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1072 (1984) (as-

serting that constitutional law "has always provided us with the language and
process within which our political identities could be confronted, debated, and
defined").
5 We describe our data sources infra Part II and our principal methodology
infraPart III. We have made all of the data and code that we use publicly available
at http://www.pozentalleynyarko.com [https://perma.cc/DE8A-3LEA]. An Online Appendix containing additional tests and results, not displayed in the Article,
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Like all empirical projects, this Article's methodology and data
have inherent limitations, and we detail many of them below.
Nevertheless, our approach affords a novel and informative
lens through which to study constitutional discourse-and discord-with heretofore unattainable granularity and scale.
We draw inspiration from an emerging body of (noncomputational) constitutional scholarship that advances or implies
descriptive claims about the historical development and substantive content of constitutional discourse in relationship to
partisan politics and political ideology. 6 Our approach allows
us to test some of these claims for the first time, both quantitatively and qualitatively. It also generates a rich portrait of the
constitutional vocabularies that members of different political
groups have deployed over the course of modern U.S. history.
Our main findings include the following:
First, constitutional discourse has grown increasingly polarized over the past four decades. Relative to the early and
mid-twentieth century, it has become substantially easier for
an algorithmic classifier to predict, based solely on the semantic content of a constitutional utterance,7 whether a Republican/conservative or a Democrat/liberal is speaking.8 If
"Democrats and Republicans now speak different languages"9
in ordinary political discourse, they speak different constitutional languages as well.
Second, constitutional discourse has polarized at least as
rapidly as (and on most measures more rapidly than) nonconstitutional political discourse over this four-decade period.
There is a debate among legal theorists as to whether framing
arguments in constitutional terms ought to dampen, amplify,
or reproduce political disagreement.1 0 We provide mixed eviis available at the same website. See David E. Pozen, Eric L. Talley & Julian
Nyarko, A ComputationalAnalysis of ConstitutionalPolarization:Online Appendix,
http://www.pozentalleynyarko.com [https://perma.cc/DSM6-P7KH] (last visited
Sept. 18, 2019) [hereinafter Pozen, Talley & Nyarko, Online App.]
6
See infra subpart I.A.
7 Our study design requires us to determine which documents within our
corpora include "constitutional" utterances and which do not. We utilize several
different protocols to make these determinations, as described infra subpart III.A.
8 See infra Part IV. Versions of this Turing-test-like method of measuring
partisanship have been used in several recent political science papers. See infra
notes 54-56 and accompanying text (summarizing this literature and explaining
how our project builds on, and departs from, it).
9 Matthew Gentzkow, Jesse M. Shapiro & Matt Taddy, Measuring Group
Differences in High-DinensionalChoices: Method andApplication to Congressional
Speech 25 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22423, 2019),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w22423 [https://perma.cc/6UYU-Y3LH].
10 See infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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dence on this score. While appeals to the canonical text clearly
have not in the aggregate been acting as a brake on polarization-and on the contrary may be exacerbating it-particularly
detailed discussions of the Constitution appear to bear fewer
markers of partisanship."
Third, conservatives have driven much of the recent uptick
in constitutional polarization. In the 1960s and early 1970s,
liberal Democrats in Congress generated the most distinctive
partisan constitutional rhetoric. Beginning around 1980, however, the constitutional utterances of relatively conservative
Republicans began to catch up and then some, becoming much
more distinctive than in prior years.' 2 Relatedly, we demonstrate that conservatives in recent Congresses have developed
an especially coherent constitutional vocabulary, with which
they have come to "own" not only terms associated with
originalism and the Framers but also terms associated with
textual provisions such as the First Amendment.' 3
And fourth, members of Congress whose party is out of
power, either in the sense of not controlling the presidency or
not controlling their own legislative chamber, are more likely
than their counterparts across the aisle to invoke the Constitution in any given speech. Although modest across years, this
differential has been magnified in certain historical eras. In
particular, congressional Democrats were significantly more
likely to invoke the Constitution during the Taft, Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover Administrations, and congressional Republicans were far more likely to do so during the Obama
Administration. 14 These results lend soft support to the "separation of parties, not powers" thesis that interbranch dynamics
depend upon party-unified versus party-divided government' 5 -but with an asymmetric twist in specific eras as between the two major parties. They suggest, further, that
constitutional rhetoric functions less as a device for consolidating authority than as a weapon of the weak in periods of highly
polarized legislative politics.
These findings-which explore only a fraction of the constitutional issues potentially implicated by our corpora' 6 -contribute to legal knowledge along multiple dimensions and, in
11
12
13
14

See infra fig. 8 and accompanying text.
See infra subpart V.A.

See infra subpart V.D.

See infra subpart V.B.
See generally Levinson & Pildes, supra note 1.
16
For some preliminary suggestions of follow-on research projects, see infra
notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
15
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our view, amply repay the effort to investigate extrajudicial constitutional discourse through a computational approach.' 7
Digital text analysis of the sort we perform cannot substitute
for the traditional "analog" methods of research into legal history, politics, and culture. But it can be a powerful complement. Some of our findings corroborate previously unverified
hypotheses or assumptions, adding texture and detail to a
Other findings shed
more or less fuzzy standard picture.'
And still others may
ground.
or
opaque
open
light on genuinely
generate new hypotheses and research projects of their own. 1 9
More broadly, our findings on the rise of constitutional polarization are so strong and so stark, when taken together, that
they raise unsettling questions about the overall state of American constitutionalism. Participants in contemporary political
debates are not simply talking in different ways about the Constitution. They largely appear to be talking past one another.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the existing literatures in law and adjacent disciplines on constitutional discourse, constitutional polarization, and digital text
analysis. Part II describes our data, drawn principally from the
Congressional Record and secondarily from the editorial pages
of the New York Times and Wall Street Journal. Part III explains
our research design for distinguishing constitutional from nonconstitutional subject matter (with additional details in Appen17
In theory, our principal methodology or something close to it could be
applied to judicial discourse as well. For example, it might be possible to ask
whether one can predict, using solely the semantic content of a circuit court
opinion, the composition of the panel according to standard scoring protocols
such as the party of the nominating president or Martin-Quinn scores. Yet as
compared to the policymakers and pundits we study, judges have much less
discretion about which topics to discuss and whether to discuss them in constitutional terms. And because all of the opinions in any given case (majorities, concurrences, and dissents) tend to be compelled to engage the same set of legal
sources and arguments, simply as a function of the case's procedural posture and
norms of judicial disputation, we are uncertain how much light computational
analysis can shed on ideological disparities. In any event, we leave such inquiries
for future research.
18 For an amusing and instructive general rebuttal to the claim that digital
history does not "tell us anything new," see Lincoln A. Mullen, Isn't It Obvious?,

LINCOLN A. MULLEN BLOG (Jan. 10, 2018), https://lincolnmullen.com/blog/isnt-it-

obvious [https://perma.cc/X8CL-TJR7].
19 To take just one, we observe that congressional references to the Constitution in general, and to jury trial rights in particular, spiked dramatically in the
early 1960s-an observation that might imply that studies of the civil rights
revolution ought to pay closer attention to debates concerning juries. See infra
notes 78-81 and accompanying text. Bruce Ackerman's 400-plus-page study of
the constitutional politics of this period, for instance, contains only a few scattered references to juries and no entry for them in the index. See generally 3
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014).

2019]

CONSTITUTIONAL POLARIZATION

7

dix A) and for using computational techniques to measure
polarization. Part IV supplies illustrative examples of changes
in constitutional discourse over the past four decades and then
presents our core results on polarization in Congress. Part V
explores some possible drivers of the polarization that Part IV
reveals, from the changing composition of the Republican Party
to the introduction of C-SPAN in the House (1979) and Senate
(1986). Part VI demonstrates that our core results do not appear confined to the floor of Congress, as similar trends have
occurred in national newspaper editorials. The Conclusion offers some preliminary thoughts on the significance of our findings and the potential for our methodology to advance the
study of constitutional law and politics.
I
FRAMING THE INQUIRY

As indicated above, students of American law, public culture, and political development have a longstanding interest in
the role of constitutional discourse in congressional debates,
newspaper editorials, and other extrajudicial forums. 2 0 The
existing empirical literature is thin. Recent scholarship on
constitutional conflict and partisan politics, however, suggests
a number of hypotheses that might be tested, at least in part,
through computational text analysis.
A.

Motivations and Research Questions

The question motivating this Article is whether and to what
extent major political blocs in the United States have diverged
in the ways they think and talk about the Constitution-a phenomenon we define as constitutionalpolarization. In particular,
we wish to investigate whether and to what extent Democrats/
liberals and Republicans/conservatives use language differently when invoking the canonical document. Such differences
may well be indicative of in-group cohesion, out-group animosity, and other phenomena associated with "polarization," but
our focus is on discourse. The Article's working conception of
polarization, accordingly, might be characterized as discursivedifferentiation-as-polarization. 2 1
See supranotes 2-4 and accompanying text.
While commentators have described "polarization" in a variety of ways, the
conception advanced here fits comfortably with standard dictionary definitions of
20
21

the term, see, e.g., Polarization, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES: ENGLISH, https://
[https://perma.cc/7LZ7en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/polarization
RLTJ] ("Division into two sharply contrasting groups or sets of opinions or be-
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As is well known, the Democratic and Republican parties
have moved further apart from each other since the 1970s
across a range of policy issues. 2 2 The constitutional piece of (or
parallel to) this polarization story is less well known. Yet according to careful legal scholars, the two parties have developed "fundamentally different" constitutional agendas since
the end of the Warren Court in 1969, with increasingly inharmonious positions on the Supreme Court and on subjects such
as criminal procedure, race, religion, and reproductive rights. 2 3
"In addition to becoming more ideologically coherent and distinct," it seems, "the parties have also become more constitutionally coherent and distinct over the past several decades." 2 4
These observations lead us to predict that constitutional
discourse has grown more polarized in the post-Warren Court
era. Appeals to the Constitution in prominent political settings, we anticipate, have devolved into increasingly easy-tocategorize camps depending on whether a Republican or a
Democrat is speaking. Such discursive polarization may involve certain constitutional terms becoming increasingly
"owned" or "dominated" by one political party, or certain modes
or styles of constitutional rhetoric becoming increasingly associated with particular sets of speakers.
The prospect of constitutional polarization raises a host of
subsidiary questions. For instance, how does the partisanship
of constitutional argument compare with that of nonconstitutional argument? More specifically, does "constitutionalizing"
liefs."), as well as with scholarship on what is sometimes called "discursive polarization," see, e.g., Michael S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE
L.J. 734, 778 & n. 159 (2008); Philip Leifeld, Reconceptualizing Major Policy
Change in the Advocacy Coalition Framework: A Discourse Network Analysis of
German PensionPolitics, 41 POL'Y STUD. J. 169, 192-93 (2013); Justus Ultermark,
Vincent A. Traag & Jeroen Bruggeman, Dissecting Discursive Contention A Relational Analysis of the Dutch Debate on Minority Integration, 1990-2006, 47 Soc.
NETWORKS 107, 111-14 (2015).
22 See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of

Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REv. 273, 277 (2011) ("The
parties have become purer distillations of themselves. They are internally more
unified and coherent, and externally more distant from each other, than anytime
over the last one hundred years."); id. at 276 n.2 (collecting political science
studies by Alan I. Abramowitz, Barbara Sinclair, and many others documenting
the emergence of hyperpolarized parties).
23 H.W. Perry, Jr. & L.A. Powe, Jr., The PoliticalBattlefor the Constitution, 21
CONST. COMMENT. 641, 641-89 (2004); see also, e.g., Mark A. Graber, Judicial
Supremacy and the Structure of PartisanConflict, 50 IND. L. REv. 141, 168 (2016)
("The contemporary Republican and Democratic Parties champion very different
constitutional approaches and visions.").
24 Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric ConstitutionalHardball, 118
COLUM. L. REv. 915, 965 (2018).
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a moral or policy debate tend to aggravate or dampen partisan
discord? Legal scholarship furnishes contradictory hypotheses
on this score. Some scholars assert that constitutional text
and doctrine provide a relatively apolitical, legalistic grammar
for bridging partisan divides and disciplining disagreement 2 5
which implies that constitutional polarization ought to be less
pronounced than political polarization generally. Other scholars, however, assert that constitutionalizing a debate raises the
stakes and fosters corrosive, winner-take-all dynamics 26
which implies the opposite. Still other scholars assert that
constitutional argument is essentially an epiphenomenon of
political argument 27 -which implies that constitutional polarization and political polarization ought to move in lockstep. Investigating whether the rate of polarization in constitutional
discourse has lagged, outpaced, or tracked the rate of polarization in nonconstitutional discourse might enable us to begin to
adjudicate among these competing claims.
Other questions concern the substance and sources of
constitutional polarization. Many political scientists argue
that the Republican Party has driven polarization in Congress
since the 1970s, as Republicans have moved significantly further to the right than Democrats have moved to the left in their
overall roll-call voting behaviors. 28 An influx of very conserva25
See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, ConstitutionalCulture, Social Movement Conflict
and ConstitutionalChange: The Case of the De FactoERA, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 1323,
1350 (2006) (suggesting that "American constitutional culture supplies practices
of argument that channel the expression of disagreement into claims about the
meaning of a shared tradition, teaching advocates to express claims of partisan
conviction in the language of public value" and thereby "disciplin[ing] these
claims").
26
See, e.g., Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court, 2017 Term-Foreword:Rights
as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 34 (2018) (suggesting that U.S.-style constitutional argument "forces us to deny that our opponents have [rights]" and "leav[es]
us farther apart at the end of a dispute than we were at the beginning"); David E.
Pozen, ConstitutionalBad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REv. 885, 940-54 (2016) (suggesting
that constitutional argument under contemporary U.S. conditions is marked by
"mutual mistrust" and accusations of bad faith); see also Adam M. Samaha, Talk
About Talking About ConstitutionalLaw, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 792-95 (hypothesizing ways in which "constitutionalizing arguments" might "drive[ ] down the
probability of compromise and trust" and "have other alienating and aggravating
effects," but noting that these hypotheses are untested and are implicitly rejected
by certain constitutional theorists).
27
See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REv. 71,
94 (suggesting that "constitutional considerations in congressional decision making" are "epiphenomenal [in] nature," as "Congress is substantially motivated by
its view about what the best policy would be").
28
For overviews of the evidence, see THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN,
IT'S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: How THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED
WITH THE NEw POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 51-58 (paperback ed. 2016); Michael Barber
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tive Republican legislators is often cited as a primary cause,2 9
among a range of potential candidates.3 0 One of us has argued, together with Joseph Fishkin, that the practice of "constitutional hardball" has followed a similar trajectory and that
"Republican politicians and activists have promoted their [constitutional] themes-originalism, strict construction, judicial
restraint-far more vigorously than Democrats have promoted
any alternative high-level constitutional vision" over this period.3 1 Prominent scholars have challenged each of these arguments. 3 2 But if the theories of "asymmetric polarization" and
"asymmetric constitutional hardball" are to be believed, they
would seem to imply that any recent uptick in the polarization
of constitutional discourse has likewise been driven by developments within the Republican coalition.
To the extent that Republicans' constitutional rhetoric has
become increasingly distinctive, a possible contributing factor
that lends itself readily to text analysis is the rise of originalism
on the right and the propagation of associated argumentative
tropes. Whereas liberals and Democrats largely appear to remain wedded to a philosophy of "living constitutionalism" and
& Nolan McCarty, Causes and Consequences of Polarization, in AM. POLITICAL Scl.
ASS'N, NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT IN POLITICS 19, 19-26 (Jane Mansbridge & Cathie Jo

Martin eds., 2013): Cynthia R. Farina, Congressional Polarization:Terminal ConstitutionalDysfunction?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1695-701 (2015); see also MATT
GROSSMANN & DAVID A. HOPKINS, ASYMMETRIC POLICS: IDEOLOGICAL REPUBLICANS AND

GROUP INTEREST DEMOCRATS 3 (2016) (arguing that the Democratic Party remains

"fundamentally a group coalition," whereas the contemporary Republican Party
can be most accurately characterized as the vehicle of an ideological movement").
29

See, e.g., Farina, supra note 28, at 1698 ("The predominant view is that

ideological divergence has been driven not by incumbents shifting their ideological position, but rather by the influx of new Members-especially Republicanswho are more extreme than their predecessors."); Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole.
Howard Rosenthal & Chris Hare, PolarizationIs Real (and Asymmetric), MONKEY

CAGE (May 15, 2012), http://themonkeycage.org/2012/05/polarization-is-realand-asymmetric [https://perma.c/8WRM-7Y9T] ("[The data are clear that [contemporary congressional polarization] is a Republican-led phenomenon where
very conservative Republicans have replaced moderate Republicans and Southern
Democrats.").

30 See generally Barber & McCarty, supra note 28, at 23-35 (noting that
"[a]though there is a broad scholarly consensus that Congress is more polarized
than any time in the recent past, there is considerably less agreement on the

causes of such polarization," and reviewing possible causes).
Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 24, at 966.
See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, ConstitutionalHardballYes, Asynmetric Not
So Much, 118 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 207 (2018) (disputing the asymmetric consti31
32

tutional hardball thesis on conceptual and historical grounds); Adam Bonica,
Mapping the IdeologicalMarketplace, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 367, 379 (2014) (finding
that congressional Democrats moved further to the left than Republicans moved
to the right in recent decades using a measure of ideology based on campaign
contributions rather than voting patterns).
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to the precedents of the Warren Court, conservatives and
Republicans have been at the vanguard of a movement since
the 1970s to interpret the Constitution according to its "original" meaning.3 3 Anecdotal evidence suggests that contemporary Republican officials may invoke the Framers' Constitution
more fervently and frequently than their Democratic counterparts. The Republican Party's 2012 and 2016 presidential
platforms, for instance, declared it to be "the party of the Constitution."3 4 The Democratic Party's platforms contained nothing comparable. 3 5 Republican voters, moreover, are commonly
described as caring more about the Supreme Court,3 6 and "the
idea that the Republican Party is the sole party of the Constitution has found resonance within the Republican Party at both
its most elite and its most populist."3 7
A separate strand of legal scholarship suggests that the
structure of constitutional discourse and discord within Congress turns not just on political ideology but also on broader
political alignments. In their influential article Separation of
Parties, Not Powers, Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes claim
that interbranch political dynamics tend to be determined less
by the constitutional distinction between the legislative and
33 See, e.g., Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 24, at 967 ("Republican officials
going back to President Nixon have agreed on the necessity of restoring the Con-

stitution's true, real, lost meaning in the face of subversion by liberal judges and
politicians."); Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily & Stephen Ansolabehere, Profiling
,

Originalism, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 356, 373 (2011) ("Eighty-five percent of originalists [in surveys from 2009 and 2010] identify as or lean toward Republican ...

whereas 21% of nonoriginalists identify as or lean toward Republican . . . .");
Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a PoliticalPractice: The Right's Living
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 554-74 (2006) (describing the rise of

originalism as a political practice on the right). Within the past decade, a small
but possibly growing number of liberals and Democrats appear to have embraced
the language of originalism, whether sincerely or strategically. See, e.g., JACK M.
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 20 (2014) (arguing that originalism and living constitu-

tionalism "are two sides of the same coin"); see also Jeremy K. Kessler & David E.
Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle Theory of Legal Theories, 83 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1819, 1844-47 (2016) (discussing the "impurification" of originalist

theory).
34

REPUBLICAN

PLATFORM

COMM.,

REPUBLICAN

PLATFORM

2016,

https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/static/home/data/platform.pdf
perma.cc/367A-7EJX;

at 9

(2016),

[https://

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM COMM., 2012 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM:

WE BELIEVE IN AMERICA 9 (2012), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/

414158/2012-republican-national-convention-platform.pdf
LQU6-795V].

[https://perma.cc/

35
Richard Primus, The Republic in Long-Term Perspective, 117 MICH. L. REV.
ONLINE 1, 12 n.27 (2018).
36 See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, PracticeMakes Precedent, 131 HARv. L. REV.

F. 32, 39 (2017) (discussing "the singular importance of the Supreme Court to
Republican voters").
37

Primus, supra note 35, at 12.
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executive branches than by the distinction between party-unified and party-divided government.3 8 Others have challenged
this claim, seeking to show the continuing vitality of legislativebranch loyalties and the Madisonian conception of separation
of powers.3 9 To the extent that Levinson and Pildes are correct
that members of Congress are more apt to check the president
when she is from the other political party, congressional discourse may reflect this pattern through a differentially greater
proclivity among such members to invoke the Constitution.

In sum, we are interested in a series of interrelated questions about the nature, degree, and determinants of constitutional polarization; the relationship of constitutional
polarization to nonconstitutional polarization; and the implications for the separation of powers. These questions are teed up
by, yet untested in, mainstream constitutional law scholarship.
Insofar as they can be translated into hypotheses about measurable patterns of discourse in Congress or in leading newspapers, our corpora and our methods allow us to shed new
empirical light on them. The effort to enhance understanding
of constitutional rhetoric and constitutional conflict seems especially important at a time when many worry that political
polarization "ranks as the most critical threat facing the United
States"4 0 and that "Americans on both the left and the right ...
See generally Levinson & Pildes, supra note 1.
See, e.g., JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS'S CONSTIITON: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND
THE SEPARATION OF PowERs 28-33 (2017) (arguing that members of Congress still
sometimes "defy presidents of their own party on policy grounds" and "put their
cameral interests ahead of their partisan ones"); Richard A. Epstein, Why Parties
and Powers Both Matter: A SeparationistResponse to Levinson and Pildes, 119
HARV. L. REV. F. 210, 213 (2006) (contending that "Levinson and Pildes have too
much faith that party unity renders structural obstacles unimportant," as
"[p]olitical actors bargain in the shadow of the future outcomes dictated in part by
our basic constitutional structures"); David Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq, Institutional
Loyalties in Constitutional Law, 85 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 33-37 (2018) (reviewing
arguable examples of "institutional loyalty" within Congress, although conceding
that such loyalty has "eroded over time").
40
Dina Smeltz, Joshua Busby & Jordan Tama, PoliticalPolarizationthe Critical Threat to US, Foreign Policy Experts Say, HILL (Nov. 9, 2018), https://
thehill.com/opinion/national-security/415881-political-polarization-is-the-critical-threat-to-us-foreign-policy [https://perma.cc/A38M-PGML]; see also, e.g.,
Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, How Wobbly Is Our Democracy?, N.Y. 'TMES (Jan.
27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/27/opinion/sunday/democracy-polarization.html [https://perma.cc/647R-GDJZ] ("Extreme polarization
can wreck even established democracies. America is no exception. As long as
Americans do not overcome their deepening partisan animosities, democracy remains at risk. . . .").
38

39
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have come to view the Constitution not as an aspirational
statement of shared principles and a bulwark against tribalism, but as a cudgel with which to attack [political] enemies." 4
We focus mainly on constitutional polarization in the postwar period to keep the scope of this study manageable. But we
emphasize that our corpora and our methods may be put to
many other uses. 4 2 Above and beyond any substantive findings or technical innovations developed here, we hope that this
Article will inspire others to build on its approach and thereby
shape a new research agenda, or set of agendas, for public law
scholarship.
B.

Other Prior Literature

In addition to the scholarship summarized in the previous
subpart, a diverse group of prior works have used traditional
research methods to investigate questions related to ours. A
smaller but growing number of works have used computational
methods related to ours to investigate different questions. To
date, the literature applying computational analysis to extrajudicial constitutional discourse has been nearly nonexistent.
Noncomputational scholarship in law and the humanities
has explored many discrete aspects of extrajudicial constitutional discourse and its relationship to political ideology. Law
professors, for instance, have offered close qualitative studies
of the constitutional rhetoric and beliefs of particular groups
and social movements, such as the Tea Party43 and the National Rifle Association.4 Political scientists have chronicled
the intellectual and institutional development of the modem
41

Amy Chua & Jed Rubenfeld, The Threat of Tribalism, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2018),

https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/10/the-threat-of-tribalism/568342 [https://perma.cc/2MD4-KFM9]. Consequentialists may also glean
useful insights from our inquiry. It is well established within positive political
theory that increased levels of partisanship in deliberative settings can yield different outcomes-for example, by altering incentives for acquiring information or
forming consensus solutions. Although some ideological diversity can lead to
more informed decisions, "too much" partisanship can undermine deliberation,
producing negative consequences for welfarist values as well as solidarity and
trust. See, e.g., Matthew Spitzer & Eric Talley, Left, Right, and Center: Strategic

Information Acquisition and Diversity in JudicialPanels, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 638
(2013) (developing a model of appellate court panels to this effect); see also
Gentzkow, Shapiro & Taddy, supranote 9, at 25 (noting reasons to suspect that
the effects of "growing partisanship of language" in Congress "could be profound").
42
In the Conclusion, we suggest a variety of additional constitutional hypotheses that might be explored with our corpora and methods.
43 E.g., Jared A. Goldstein, The Tea Party's Constitution, 88 DENv. U. L. REV.
559 (2011).

44

E.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dead orAlive: Originalismas PopularConstitutionalism

in Heller, 122 HARv. L. REv. 191 (2008).
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conservative legal movement. 45 Historians have written about
the politics of memory, with application to constitutionally
freighted topics such as slavery and the Civil War. 4 6 A few
historians and legal theorists have studied the deployment in
constitutional discourse of particular high-level concepts, such
as sovereignty or self-government.4 7
More recently, digital text analysis has made inroads into a
number of public law fields.4 8 Comparative constitutional law
scholars, for instance, have used automated content analysis
to identify patterns across written constitutions. 4 9 An interdisciplinary team of authors has used computational techniques
to identify the writing styles of Supreme Court Justices. 5 0
Corpus linguistics has become increasingly common in
originalist and textualist circles.5 1 Our colleague Kellen Funk,
together with Lincoln Mullen, published an article last year in
the American HistoricalReview employing digital text analysis
to trace the migration of the Field Code across the American
South and West during the late nineteenth century. 5 2 Closer to
this Article's concerns, a student note has applied unsupervised topic modeling to a set of U.S. newspapers from
45
E.g., STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE
BATILE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAw (2010).
46
E.g., DAVID W. BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN MEMORY

(2002).
E.g., KAHN, supra note 2; KAMMEN, supra note 2.
Two of us have used digital text analysis extensively in our scholarship on
private law subjects. See infra notes 84-86 (citing recent works). For an overview
of recent scholarship using digital text analysis in fields ranging from life sciences
to literary criticism, see Matthew Sag, The New Legal Landscapefor Text Mining
and Machine Learning, 66 J. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y U.S.A. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 4-9), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3331606 [https://perma.cc/6F9JLAKC].
49
E.g., David S. Law, The Global Languageof Human Rights:A Computational
LinguisticAnalysis, 12 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 111 (2018).
50
Keith Carlson, Michael A. Livermore & Daniel Rockmore, A Quantitative
Analysis of Writing Style on the U.S. Supreme Court, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1461
(2016); see also id. at 1472-73 (discussing "a nascent movement" in the legal
literature to apply computational stylistic analysis to judicial opinions); id. at
1467-68 (reviewing other applications of computational analysis to Supreme
Court-related texts); Michael A. Livermore, Allen B. Riddell & Daniel N. Rockmore,
The Supreme Court and the JudicialGenre, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 837, 841 (2017) (using
topic modeling to study whether the Supreme "Court's writings as a whole have
grown more semantically distinctive over the course of the twentieth century, as
compared to the judicial opinions issued by other American courts").
5
E.g., Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning,
127 YALE L.J. 788 (2018); James C. Phillips, Daniel M. Ortner & Thomas R. Lee,
Corpus Linguistics and Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to Make Originalism
More Empirical, 126 YALE L.J.F. 21 (2016).
52 Kellen Funk & Lincoln A. Mullen, The Spine of American Law: Digital Text
Analysis and U.S. Legal Practice, 123 AM. HIST. REV. 132 (2018).
47
48

2019]1

CONSTITUTIONAL POLARIZATION

15

1866 to 1884 to evaluate Bruce Ackerman's theory of
non-Article V constitutional amendment. 5 3
Outside of law, political scientists and computer scientists
have used a variety of techniques to mine the texts of political
speeches and manifestos. The majority of these studies seek to
exploit the texts as a means to measure the ideology of their
creators. 5 4 In contrast, our primary focus lies not in finding a
good proxy for political ideology per se, but in comparing the
ease with which speakers from different partisan and ideological camps can be predicted over time.
This Article is most closely related to a new paper by Matthew Gentzkow, Jesse Shapiro, and Matt Taddy, who use machine-learning methods to classify remarks made by members
of Congress and find that the partisanship of their language
has "exploded" since 1994.55 We build upon and extend
Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Taddy's pioneering work in multiple
ways. Schematically, as the first authors to examine the entire
Congressional Record over multiple decades, their paper is
largely exploratory, whereas we focus on a set of hypotheses
derived from legal scholarship. Methodologically, rather than
relying on a generative model of discourse, we use the predictive quality of machine-learning algorithms to estimate and
quantify polarization. In so doing, we follow a nascent trend in

&

53 Daniel Taylor Young, Note, How Do You Measure a ConstitutionalMoment?
UsingAlgorithmic Topic Modeling to EvaluateBruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1990 (2013); cf. David S. Law, ConstitutionalArchetypes, 95 Thx. L. REV. 153, 164 n.31 (2016) (stating that "[a]s of August 6, 2015, a
search of Westlaw's database of law reviews and journals" yielded only one result-Young's note-for the term "topic model" and zero results for the terms
"automated content analysis" and "text analysis").
54 See, e.g., Daniel Diermeier, Jean-Frangois Godbout, Bet Yu & Stefan Kaufmann, Language and Ideology in Congress, 42 BRIT. J. POL. Scl. 31 (2011) (using
Support Vector Machines to predict the ideology of senators based on speeches in
the 101st to 108th Congresses); Mohit lyyer, Peter Enns, Jordan Boyd-Graber
Philip Resnik, PoliticalIdeology Detection Using Recursive Neural Networks, PROC.
52ND ANN. MEETING AsS'N COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 1113 (2014) (creating a corpus

of sentences and phrases from congressional debates that were hand-annotated
by human coders for the predicted ideology of the speaker, then using a recursive
neural network to estimate the speaker's ideology); Michael Laver, Kenneth Benoit
& John Garry, ExtractingPolicy Positionsfrom PoliticalTexts Using Words as Data,
97 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 311 (2003) (using a word-scoring technique to determine the
policy positions of political parties in Britain, Ireland, and Germany based on
their party manifestos and legislative speeches); Jonathan B. Slapin & SvenOliver Proksch, A Scaling Model for Estimating Time-Series Party Positionsfrom
Texts, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 705 (2008) (using a scaling algorithm to locate German
political parties on a left-right spectrum based on party manifestos).
5s Gentzkow, Shapiro & Taddy, supranote 9, at 3, 17. Their paper appears to
be the first to use "statistical predictability in a probability model of speech as a
metric of differences in partisan language between groups." Id. at 4-5.
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the literature on digital text analysis to measure polarization
based on the quality of automated classifiers.5 6 And substantively, we identify and analyze a particular subset of remarks
that relate to the Constitution, with nonconstitutional remarks
functioning as a kind of control group benchmark. As far as we
are aware, this Article is the first to use computational techniques to investigate constitutional polarization-or, for that
matter, any other question concerning the ideological or partisan structure of constitutional discourse outside the courts.
II
DATA SOURCES

Our principal data set consists of a "substantially verbatim" transcript of remarks made by U.S. senators and representatives on the floors of the Senate and the House of
Representatives from the 43rd Congress (beginning in 1873)
through the 114th Congress (beginning in 2015).57 These data
were recently made available by Gentzkow, Shapiro, and
Taddy, who cleaned and parsed the text of the Congressional
Record. 5 8 Extensions of Remarks, used by members of the
House to insert statements and materials not read aloud on the
House floor,5 9 are excluded, as are all other unspoken statements and materials inserted in the record and all remarks

56 Of particular note, see Andrew Peterson & Arthur Spirling, Classification
Accuracy as a Substantive Quantity ofInterest: Measuring Polarizationin Westminster Systems, 26 POL. ANALYSIS 120, 120 (2018) (demonstrating that "machine
learning 'accuracy'" at predicting the party affiliation of parliamentary speakers
"provides an informative measurement instrument for the degree of aggregate
polarization in the UK House of Commons over time"); Joseph Engelberg, Matthew
Henriksson & Jared Williams, The Partisanship of Financial Regulators (July 10,
2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (employing machine-learning classifiers to analyze the partisanship of speeches by Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) commissioners and Federal Reserve Board governors since the
1930s, and finding a significant increase at the SEC over the past two decades).
57
See MILDRED L. AMER, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., 93-60 GOV, THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: CONTENT, HISTORY, AND ISSUES 6 (1993) (describing the Congres-

sional Record as "a substantially verbatim account of the proceedings of
Congress" and "an account of everything that is said and done on the floors of the
House and Senate").
58 Matthew Gentzkow, Jesse M. Shapiro & Matt Taddy, CongressionalRecord
for the 43rd-1 14th Congresses: Parsed Speeches and Phrase Counts, STANFORD
SSDS

SOCIAL

SCIENCE

DATA

COLLECTION

(Jan.

16,

2018),

https://

data.stanford.edu/congress text [https://perma.cc/H32H-7UWD].
For a detailed description of this process, see Gentzkow, Shapiro & Taddy, supra note 9,
at 6-8 & Online App.
59 See AMER, supra note 57, at 8.
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made by nonlegislators (for example, a chaplain or a clerk). 6 0
Even though much of the work of Congress occurs in committees and attendance at floor debates may be spotty, these debates are of potential interest to nonattending members,
executive and judicial actors, journalists, voters, and interest
groups, among other audiences, and have been found to be
"crucial" to congressional deliberation and the development of
legislation.6 1
Consistent with the literature on digital text analysis, we
will refer to the individual remarks in the data set as "documents." The overall collection of remarks is the "corpus." Each
document in the corpus is complemented with additional information, including the speaker's name and political party affiliation, the date, and the chamber in which the remark was made.
The original creation of the corpus relied on optical character recognition (OCR) to convert images of Congressional Record pages into machine-encoded text. While OCR processes
have become increasingly precise, accuracy still varies with the
quality of the image and the font used in the original text.
Upon inspection, it became apparent that the word "Constitution" was either misspelled or miscoded several hundred thousand times in the data set, primarily in the early periods of
observation. To avoid time-dependent inaccuracies when
scanning the text for references to "Constitution" and similar
terms, we identified and corrected these misspellings using a
procedure that makes use of word embeddings. 6 2
Like virtually all very large textual data sets, the corpus
contains dozens of common multiword phrases (or n-grams).
60 See Gentzkow, Shapiro & Taddy, supra note 9, at 6. Following Gentzkow,
Shapiro, and Taddy, we use the bound edition of the Congressional Record
through the 111th Congress and the daily edition thereafter. See id.
61

GARY MUCCIARONI & PAUL J. QUIRK, DELIBERATIVE CHOICES: DEBATING PUBLIC

POLICY IN CONGRESS 6 (2006); see also STEVEN S. SMrfH, CALL TO ORDER: FLOOR
POLITICS IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE 237 (1989) (noting that "floor speeches are used

by members to explain their votes and advertise themselves; and, what is perhaps
just as important, discussion at the floor stage contributes to the sense of legitimacy and fairness of congressional decisions").
62 Word embeddings are vector representations of words that preserve the
words' semantic meaning relative to other words-a process that can be used to
generate approximate synonyms based on contextual usage. We calibrated a
common word-embedding model on the entire Congressional Record and queried
our model for the 5000 most similar terms to the word "Constitution" and its
variants. This calibration resulted in many instances of misspelled terms, such
as "Contitution" or "Constiution." We then used an automated process to correct
these misspellings where they appeared. A manual audit suggests that our process successfully corrected virtually all misspellings. Our trained word embeddings are available at http://www.pozentalleynyarko.com [https://perma.cc/
DE8A-3LEA].
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The informational content of these phrases is different from the
informational content of their individual terms, a fact that is of
particular importance when predicting a speaker's political affiliation. For instance, a phrase such as "eminent domain"
might be especially popular among conservative or Republican
speakers, even if the terms "eminent" and "domain" on their
own have no determinate political valence. To account for this
possibility, we trained and applied a well-known phrasing
model that identifies common phrases and connects their com-

ponent parts with an underscore

("_").63

Once joined, such

multiword phrases can be treated as a single term. In addition,
before analyzing the corpus, we cleaned the textual data using
a variety of standard text-processing protocols designed to convert or remove certain characters to allow for accurate
analysis.6 4
Table 1 provides a summary of all remarks with an identified speaker.6 5 Overall, the data set includes 13.5 million documents, comprising a total of 1.8 billion words spoken by
37,059 senators and representatives between 1873 and 2016.

63
See Tomas Mikolov, Ilya Sutskever, Kai Chen, Greg Corrado & Jeffrey
Dean, DistributedRepresentationsof Words and Phrasesand Their Compositionality, 26 ADVANCES NEURAL INFO. PROCESSING SYs. 3111, 3115-16 (2013).
64 These preprocessing steps include (1) converting all words to lowercase, (2)

removing all punctuation and special characters, and (3) shortening words to
their grammatical stems. Steps I and 2 are self-explanatory. Step 3 involves
removing prefixes and suffixes from individual words, leaving only the word stem.
The motivation for stemming is that terms originating from the same word stem
should be treated the same, as morphological affixes are substantially the product
of grammatical rules and conventions rather than the actual meaning of the word.
By way of illustration, consider the following sentence: <Our study explores
statements in Congress, making use of text analysisl>. After preprocessing, the
sentence is mapped to: <our studi explor statement in congress make use of text
analysi>. Each resulting term represents a grammatical stem from which many
tenses or other word forms might emanate. For example, "studi" effectively stands
in for "study," "studying," "studies," and "studied."
Another common step in preprocessing is to remove so-called stop words,
such as common conjunctions and prepositions, as these words are generally
assumed not to contain important information yet render analysis more complex.
We opted against utilizing this procedure. A critical step in our analysis involves
scanning the text for common constitutional phrases, and some of these phrases
include stop words: for instance, "bill of rights." Because omitting these stop
words would increase the probability of false positives, we preserve them.
65
A small percentage of the documents in the corpus (typically between 1%
and 3% per Congress) do not have identifiable speaker information associated
with them. See Gentzkow, Shapiro & Taddy, supra note 9, at Online App. 9 tbl. 1
("Match rate" column). We exclude these documents from all analyses.
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Although this Article focuses on the remarkably rich and
politically pivotal Congressional Record data set, we are mindful that constitutional discourse occurs in many other extrajudicial venues. As a robustness check on some of our results
from Congress as well as an inquiry of independent interest, we
also draw on a more limited data set of editorials in two of the
leading newspapers on the liberal and conservative sides, respectively: the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal.
Using the ProQuest and Factiva databases, we harvested the
content of every editorial by each newspaper's editorial board
(rather than a named op-ed contributor) that was published
from 1993 to November 2018,66 cleaning and parsing these
data in a similar manner as with the text of the Congressional
Record. The resulting corpus, discussed in Part VI, contains
57,884 editorials. Approximately 42% of the editorials are from
the Journaland 58% from the Times, with an average length of
slightly over 500 words per document.
III
RESEARCH DESIGN

The central goal of this Article is to use machine-learning
techniques to capture and trace the evolutionary path of constitutional polarization as manifested in the text of congressional remarks (and secondarily newspaper editorials).
Accordingly, our analysis must make distinctions along three
principal dimensions:
(1) Constitutional subject matter. We focus on "constitutional" documents, using "nonconstitutional" documents
as a benchmark for comparison.
(2) Speaker ideology. We distinguish between "liberal" and
"conservative" and between Democratic and Republican
voices.
(3) Dynamic effects. We evaluate trends over time and the
extent to which the trends appear to be driven by any
specific party or ideology.

These three dimensions are captured heuristically by Figure 1 below. Rows capture the content of a document (whether
it has constitutional subject matter). Columns capture the ideology of the speaker (liberal versus conservative; or alternatively, Democratic versus Republican). The depth dimension
captures time (whether the document occurs early or late in the
66
Specifically, we harvested the content of every editorial in this period for
which full-text extraction was available and the author was either anonymous or
identified as "Editor" or "Editorial Board."

oberaionr period It is important to note that Figure 1 reflet the siples t possible rendering of these three duimensions

bybrain the intdo binary groups. In actuality, our data
alo us to subdiv ide ech dimension along more granldar
magis Fo eample the ideology of conlgresstinal sp~eakeris
mih be represetedI by continuous political scors on the
Poo~IiI e-oenhscl; theI c 2onstitutijonal-ness" of a docu-a
ment maigh be capt ured by the intensity with wich it invokes
contiutonl terms; and tine might be measuired on a far
mor refie (scale suchB as day/month/year/C ongress.

Tw of tese dimensions, Early/Late and Libe ral/C onservative armelatively in ttive. But at least two aspects ot
ourt enterrse are me conmplex. Firstnm ounquiry requires us
to dvse an mens for nientying and distinguishing between
"onstitutinal" ad "nonconstitutional" documents Ithe rows
of Fiure 1. Scond, we must advance a plausibler and reliable
mesue f polar izat ion" thbat is also suffnictly scalable to
evaluat 1arge corpor a such as thei Congressional Re ord. We
discss hes two challenges and our proposed solions in
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Constitutional Versus Nonconstitutional Subject Matter

The first hurdle that our study design presents is how to
determine what it means for a document to have constitutional
subject matter. There is no off-the-shelf solution. Leading
scholars have described the U.S. Constitution as "a model instance of . . . an essentially contested concept," which "few
treat .. . as having an easily knowable, fixed identity."6 8 It is
not hard to imagine how two constitutional lawyers might read
the same document-say, a speech about the history of the
civil rights movement that never invokes the Constitution by
name-and come to different conclusions about whether the
document sounds in a constitutional register. Accordingly, in
classifying the documents in our corpora as "constitutional" or
"nonconstitutional," we must take care to pursue a strategy
flexible enough for us to vary our classification criteria for the
sake of testing robustness, all the while preserving
replicability.
In general, several approaches are possible for attempting
to classify documents in a corpus by subject matter. The simplest and most intuitive approach asks whether a document
utilizes a specified combination of terms within a designated
lexicon (or "dictionary") defined by the researcher.6 9 An alternative approach, sometimes called supervised learning, exposes human coders to a random subset of documents and
asks them to make subject matter classifications directly and
subjectively. That coded subset can then be used to train an
algorithmic classifier to identify similar syntactical patterns in
the remainder of the corpus. Supervised learning approaches
have been shown to have considerable power in parsing legal
texts, as they can leverage the expertise of human classifiers in
interpreting nuance and context. 7 0
68
SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 124 (2d ed. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also MICHAEL J. GERHARDT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
§ 1.01, at 3 (4th ed. 2013) ("A colleague likes to say that 'the trouble with constitutional law is that nobody knows what counts as an argument.' It may be more
accurate to say that plenty of people think they know what does or should count,
and that they often disagree."); Anne Meuwese & Marnix Snel, 'Constitutional
Dialogue': An Overview, 9 UTRECHT L. REV. 123, 123 (2013) (noting that "the
academic and the practical legal community still appears to be unsure what
qualifies as a '[constitutionall dialogue' either in practice or in theory").
69 This approach can also be extended through word embeddings, which use
the dictionary as a seed to train an algorithmic protocol to "learn" functional
synonyms of the specified key words. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
70
See Eric L. Talley, Is the Future of Law a Driverless Car?Assessing How the
Data-Analytics Revolution Will Transform Legal Practice, 174 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 183, 196-203 (2018).
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Although we experimented with variants of both techniques, we ultimately settled on a dictionary-driven approach
for numerous reasons. First, supervised learning necessarily
entails using contemporary human coders to classify documents, yet our study design requires us to track the evolution
of constitutional polarization over multiple decades (indeed
centuries). As one goes back further in time, the reliability of
supervised learning for distinguishing constitutional from nonconstitutional content breaks down: turns of phrase that would
be clear markers of constitutional discourse to a reader today
might have had very different connotations a half century ago,
and vice versa.7 1 Second, even within a given historical era, the
constitutional judgments made by human coders might be affected by unconscious and unobservable ideological conditioning, whose bias we can neither measure nor predict. Finally, in
investigating the polarization of constitutional discourse, our
chief interest lies in identifying unambiguously constitutional
arguments tied to the canonical document itself. Given this
interest, as well as the perpetual disagreement over the nature
of constitutionalism and the legitimate sources of constitutional meaning, it is all the more important to employ a highly
transparent and replicable classification strategy, even if the
strategy ends up being somewhat mechanical as a result.
We thus employ a series of dictionaries of constitutionally
relevant expressions to determine whether-and to what degree-a document is deemed "constitutional." These dictionaries, which we created prior to our analysis, generally have a
nested structure, such that each successive dictionary (with
one exception) incorporates its predecessors and then adds
additional terms. Appendix A lists the terms contained in the
dictionaries, along with an explanation of how they were constructed. 7 2 None of the dictionaries is tethered to the Congressional Record; all can be ported to other research projects. In
addition to enabling the present inquiry, it is our hope that
these dictionaries will enable future inquiries by scholars from
71
Because a time machine was not within our allocated research funds for
this project, we were unable to recruit human classifiers from the relevant historical eras.
72
In general, as Appendix A explains, each of our dictionaries was con-

structed in an expansive fashion, resolving doubts about the "constitutional-

ness" of a term in favor of inclusion. However, at the risk of losing some potentially interesting information, we opted against including case names in any dictionary because of their inherent time-boundedness. For a similar reason, we
omitted judicial neologisms that would not have appeared in constitutional discourse before they were introduced in recent cases.
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diverse disciplines into the constitutional dimensions of textual
data. The dictionaries' composition is as follows:
*

*

*

*

*

Minimal. This is the simplest and starkest dictionary,
limited to the term "constitution" and all variants and
stems thereof ("constitutional," "unconstitutional," "nonconstitutional," "extraconstitutional," "constitutionally,"
"unconstitutionally," and so forth). 7 3 Using the Minimal
dictionary, a document would be deemed constitutional if
and only if it explicitly mentions this term.
Textual. This dictionary includes the Minimal dictionary
and, in addition, the titles of all constitutional articles,
amendments, and clauses, both in their standard legal
formulations (for example, "second amendment") and in
well-recognized colloquial synonyms (for example, "right
to bear arms amendment").
Extended Textual. This dictionary includes the Minimal
and Textual dictionaries and, in addition, dozens of
phrases that appear in the text of the Constitution and
lack a common extraconstitutional usage (for example,
"advice and consent," "equal protection," and "searches
and seizures").
Originalism. This dictionary consists of a variety of terms
associated with the constitutional founding and the Constitution's original meaning (for example, "founding fathers," "original intent," and "philadelphia convention").
This dictionary does not build on the others described
above and, in that sense, is an outlier within our set; we
constructed it specifically to investigate the rise of
originalism.74
Expansive. This dictionary includes the Minimal, Textual, Extended Textual, and Originalism dictionaries and,
in addition, over 100 important constitutional concepts
that are at least several decades old (for example, "administrative state," "freedom of contract," "judicial review,"
"separate but equal," and "separation of powers"). The
construction of this dictionary involved a considerable
amount of subjective judgment. Some version of this dic-

73
The preprocessing of the text, described supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text, renders punctuation and capitalization irrelevant and guarantees that
we capture all variants of the word stem "constitut." At the same time, we took
care not to stem words such as "constitute," "constitutes," and "constituted" to
avoid conflation. Our approach does run the risk of capturing invocations of
foreign constitutions and the fifty states' constitutions, but everything we have
seen from our data suggests that such invocations are very rare on the floor of
Congress relative to references to the U.S. Constitution-and remarks about U.S.
state constitutions, at least, arguably deserve to be included for purposes of this
study.
74
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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tionary is indispensable, however, if one wishes to investigate not only what constitutional scholars call the "big-C,"
"large-C," or "written" Constitution-the canonical document that dates from 1787 and is the focus of the other
dictionaries-but also what is known as the "small-c" or
"unwritten" constitution, or "the web of documents, practices, institutions, norms, and traditions that structure
American government."7

The baseline results presented in Parts IV and V rely on the
Minimal dictionary. Our principal justification for this decision
is that it supplies the most straightforward and uncontroversial means of identifying "constitutional" documents. It also
efficiently captures the possibility, implicated by many of the
hypotheses we explore, that explicit invocations of the Constitution serve a distinctive role in political rhetoric. Moving beyond the Minimal dictionary reduces the risk of false negatives
(failing to classify constitutional documents as such), but it
increases the risk of false positives and introduces concerns
about potential arbitrariness and bias in our estimates. 7 6 Consequently, our baseline approach can be described as deliberately underinclusive. That said, we recognize that relying on
the Minimal dictionary may be too crude and conservative in
some respects, and that documents in our corpora may contain
terms and themes that are widely understood to be of constitutional import even if they never once mention variants of the
word "constitution." We therefore use the larger dictionaries as
a robustness check and also, in Part V, as a tool for illustrating
in greater detail the content of constitutional polarization.
Using any given dictionary, we can ask not only whether
the expressions in that dictionary appear in a document but
also how often they appear. In this way, we can extract a
constitutional "score" (p) for each document. Its functional
form is:
75

Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079,

1082 (2013); see also, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITEEN CONSTITUTION, at

xi (2012) (describing the "unwritten Constitution" as a set of extratextual prac-

tices, precedents, and norms that help to "fill in [the] gaps" of and "to stabilize" the
written Constitution); David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the SeparationofPowers, 124

YALE L.J. 2, 33 (2014) (describing the small-c constitution as "the relatively stable
set of rules, practices, and arrangements that are not housed in the constitutional
text but nonetheless are thought to serve a constitutional function because they
are important to the structure of government or because they reflect fundamental
American values" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
76 Consider again the example of a speech about the history of the civil rights
movement that never invokes the Constitution by name (and the debate that
might be had over whether this speech is best understood as a "constitutional"
document or not). See supra text accompanying note 68.
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The great majority of documents in the corpus contain no
terms from either dictionary (98% and 97%, respectively) and
thus have a score of p = 0. For purposes of illustration, Figure
2 excludes these zero-score documents, displaying a relatively
smooth conditional distribution for the population of documents with positive p scores. 7 7
For a given dictionary, our key criterion for distinguishing
constitutional from nonconstitutional subject matter hinges on
where a document's p score sits relative to a series of hypothesized cutoff values. All documents with p scores exceeding the
specified cutoff are deemed to involve constitutional discourse.
Documents with scores of 0 are deemed in all cases to be nonconstitutional. Documents with scores greater than 0 but below the specified cutoff are deemed ambiguous and are
therefore excluded from the analysis. The higher the level at
which the cutoff is fixed, then, the more restrictive is the test
for inferring constitutional subject matter.
Because there is no inherently correct way to select the
cutoff, we make use of the flexibility that a score-based approach affords to vary the classification criteria, effectively
modulating between narrower and broader conceptions of what
counts as constitutional discourse (holding constant the dictionary). For our baseline results using the Minimal dictionary,
we fix the critical cutoff at 0, such that any mention of a variant
of the term "constitution" results in the document being classified as constitutional. For our robustness checks using the
Extended Textual dictionary, we set the cutoff at three progressively more restrictive values. First, as with the Minimal dictionary, we fix the cutoff at 0. Next, we set the cutoff at the
conditional median, such that half of the documents with positive scores are classified as constitutional. This point occurs at
a value of around p = 0.005. Finally, we set the cutoff at the
conditional eighth decile, such that only the highest-scoring
20% of documents with positive scores are classified as constitutional. This point occurs at a value of approximately p =
0.017.

77 To promote readability, we also exclude from both plots 3110 documents
(0.0002% of the corpus) with extreme values of p > 0.08.
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FIGURE 3: SHARE OF "CONSTITUTIONAL" DOCUMENTS (BY CONGRESS)
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Figure 3 depicts the relative frequency of "constitutional"
documents in the Congressional Record over time, pursuant to
each of the approaches just described. The most permissive
approach uses a cutoff of 0. Again, this is equivalent to defining a document as constitutional if any term from the applicable dictionary is mentioned. The uppermost dotted line is
higher than the dashed line because the Extended Textual dictionary contains more terms than the Minimal dictionary. Naturally, definitions based on the median and eighth-decile
cutoffs lead to fewer documents being classified as constitutional. Under the most restrictive standard, fewer than 1% of
documents are deemed to involve constitutional discourse.
While the overall frequencies of constitutional documents may
appear low (by any measure), the gargantuan size of the Congressional Record ensures that there are still an ample number
of remarks to work with.
We have not yet reached our results, but Figure 3 itself
unveils a trove of new information for constitutional scholars
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and historians. For instance, it reveals that on multiple measures, levels of constitutional discourse in Congress surged in
the immediate postwar period, reaching their apogee in the
88th Congress of 1963 and 1964 (for the solid and dash-dotted
lines). The underlying data show that among all of the terms in
the Extended Textual dictionary apart from "constitution" itself, congresspersons invoked "fourteenth amendment," "equal
protection," and "bill of rights" most frequently in that Congress.7 8 If one looks at these congresspersons' use of additional terms from the Expansive dictionary, one finds that they
invoked "civil rights," "trial by jury," and "jury trial" most frequently.7 9 These findings might be seen to support Ackerman's
claim that the civil rights movement and the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 together amounted to a transformative
"constitutional moment."8 0 At the same time, they suggest that
constitutional debate has never taken up a large percentage of
congressional floor time and that the absence of juries from
Ackerman's constitutional narrative is a significant omission.11
More broadly, Figure 3 demonstrates that even as the
share of all remarks made on the House and Senate floors that
mention the Constitution or a specific provision thereof has
generally been rising since the early 1900s, the share of all
remarks that include a large number of terms present in the
Constitution (p > 0.017) has generally been declining since the
mid- 1900s. This may imply that while contemporary members
of Congress are more likely than their predecessors to invoke
the Constitution in any given remark, they also tend to do so in
a relatively superficial manner.
B.

Assessing Polarization Through Classification

Having established both a set of dictionaries and criteria
for identifying constitutional subject matter, we turn to the
principal measure of interest for this study: the degree of "polarization" manifested in a document's textual content. Here as
78

Pozen, Talley & Nyarko, Online App., supranote 5, at tbl. OA.1.

79
80

Id.
See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 19, at 118-19.

81 See supra note 19. On the intersection of local jury practices and the civil
rights struggle during this period, see, for example, Leo Adde, American Jury
System: Reexamination and Change, in 2 EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS 686, 695

(1972), https://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre
1972091300 [https://perma.cc/5P62-K74F] ("The American jury system endured
one of its severest crises during the height of the civil rights movement in the
South during the 1960s. When civil rights violations, including murder, were
prosecuted, it became obvious that a double standard for meting out justice
existed.").
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well, several avenues suggest themselves. One obvious candidate is to ask human coders to read and score each document
(or a random subset) on a partisanship scale. As before, such
an approach faces severe constraints. The first is the sheer size
of the Congressional Record corpus, a full or even remotely
thorough reading of which would require an infeasible amount
of time and labor. Another concern is coding error, a risk that
may be exacerbated by repetitive tasks. Human coders may
also disagree about the partisan or ideological nature of a particular document, leading to inconsistent classifications. And,
as noted above, 82 because human coders are unavoidably creatures of their historical era, they may be too tethered to contemporary linguistic and social cues to generate reliable
measures over time.
Given these concerns, we pursue an alternative means for
measuring polarization-through algorithmic classifiers. Specifically, we propose to measure polarization by evaluating how
easy or hard it is for a machine-learning algorithm to predict a
speaker's political ideology or party affiliation based solely on
the text of her remarks.8 3 If the algorithm has a difficult time
making such predictions, it suggests a lack of polarization, as
even speakers from opposing camps tend to share a common
vocabulary and utilize the same focal concepts. If the algorithm has an easy time making such predictions, in contrast,
it suggests that speakers from opposing camps are no longer
employing similar or overlapping rhetoric and are instead "talking past" one another.
Two of us have previously employed machine-learning
methods to assess large data sets of securities disclosures,8 4
M&A agreements, 8 5 and other commercial contracts,8 6 and we
pursue a similar strategy here. A simplified description should
See supra text accompanying note 71.
See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing recent political
science studies employing related approaches). As Andrew Peterson and Arthur
Spirling put it in their study of UK Members of Parliament (MPs): "Our central
logic is to conceive of [MPs] from different parties as being more or less distinguishable over time, in terms of what they choose to say. How distinguishable
they are in practice is determined by a set of machine learning algorithms."
Peterson & Spirling, supranote 56, at 121.
84
Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the FiduciaryDuty of
Loyalty: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 CoLuM. L.
REv. 1075 (2017); Talley, supra note 70, at 188-201.
85
Eric Talley & Drew O'Kane, The Measure of a MAC: A Machine-Learning
Protocolfor Analyzing Force Majeure Clauses in M&A Agreements, 168 J. INST.
THEORETICAL ECON. 181 (2012).
86
Julian Nyarko, We'll See You in ... Court! The Lack ofArbitrationClauses in
InternationalCommercial Contracts, 58 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 6 (2019).
82

&
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suffice for conveying its basic elements and motivating intuitions.8 7 Examining the set of documents from each two-year
Congress separately, we proceed in four incremental steps:8 8
(1) We divide documents at random into a "training set" and
a "test set."
(2) Using only the training set, we calibrate a statistical algorithm that identifies which semantic characteristics of
the text are most useful for distinguishing "Conservative"
(or alternatively, Republican) speakers from "Liberal" (or
alternatively, Democratic) speakers. This training step
results in a calibrated probabilistic estimate as to
whether each document came from a Conservative or Liberal speaker.
(3) We then apply the trained classifier to the test set of documents, generating predictions of speaker ideology for
those previously "unseen" documents.
(4) Finally, we assess the classifier's performance on the test
set in terms of its classification accuracy as well as other
diagnostic measures.
Step 1 is straightforward and is applied to all documents
for which the speaker is known. Each iteration of Step 1 specifies an 80%-20% split between training and test sets.8 9 To
perform Step 2, there are now several classification algorithms
available within the machine-learning literature for researchers wishing to train a predictive classifier. For analysis of text,
87
Readers interested in the more technical aspects of this approach are
referred to the abovementioned articles and the code we have made available
online. For an excellent introduction to the fundamentals of machine learning,
see TREVOR HASTIE, ROBERT TIBSHIRANI & JEROME FRIEDMAN, THE ELEMENTS OF STATISTICAL LEARNING: DATA MINING, INFERENCE, AND PREDICTION (2d ed. 2009).

88 In contrast to the preprocessing that we performed on the textual data for
purposes of determining the "constitutional-ness" of each document, see supra
note 64, for this exercise we did not use text stemming. The reason is that
stemming loses a small amount of information that may be relevant for analyzing
polarization. For instance, it is possible that there is a difference in the way
Democrats and Republicans use the word "Constitution" in comparison to the
word "constitutional," but stemming would reduce both words to "constitut."
With that said, whether we stem the text or not is of no significant relevance to the
performance of our classifier.
89 Specifically, we consider several possible divisions of training data and test
data using a process known as 5-fold cross validation. The data are randomly
assigned to one of five different subsets, each containing roughly 20% of observations. The test set is one of these subsets; the remaining four subsets constitute
the training set. After evaluating the classifier's performance on the test set once,
we repeat the process but with a different test set, cycling through the process five
times. For instance, in iteration 1, the training set is {Subsetl,Subset2,Subset3,
Subset4} and the test set is {Subset5}. In iteration 2, the training set is {SubsetlSubset2,Subset3, Subset5} and the test set is {Subset4}. And so on. The
performance metrics reported below thus reflect average measures across all five
"folds" in the validation.
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the Multinomial Naive Bayes (MNB) classifier works particularly well. 9 0 In rough terms, the MNB classifier tabulates the
frequencies of various terms' use by each group (here, Conservatives and Liberals). It does so across all terms and then uses
Bayes' theorem to invert the process, extracting the "reverse"
conditional probability of speaker ideology given the terms
used.9 1 When the dust settles, every term in the training set
will be associated with an estimated probability that it came
from a Conservative versus a Liberal speaker. 9 2
In Step 3, the probabilistic predictive model calibrated in
Step 2-the trained MNB classifier-is applied to the documents in the test set, with the MNB classifier once again rendering a probabilistic prediction of ideology conditional on the
terms used. Finally, in Step 4, we evaluate the performance of
the classifier with a variety of diagnostic measures that capture
the difficulty/ease of predicting the political ideology or party
affiliation of the speaker based on the text.
We focus on three well-known measures of classifier performance, which in turn serve as measures of polarization. The
first is the fraction of documents that are correctly classified, or
the "correct classification rate" (CCR): the sum of "true positive"
90 Even so, our results appear to be robust to other types of classifiers. In
addition to the MNB classifier, we examined the quality of the Multilayer Perceptron classifier, the K-Neighbors classifier, the Gaussian Process classifier, the
Decision Trees classifier, and the C-Support Vector Classification (C-SVC) classifier for predicting speakers' party affiliation for constitutional documents in selected periods. Only the C-SVC classifier, we found, sometimes slightly
outperforms the MNB classifier (by about 3% based on the "correct classification
rate"). However, the training duration of the C-SVC classifier is more than twenty
times that of the MNB classifier. For large data sets such as the Congressional
Record, its implementation is thus computationally infeasible.
91 The MNB classifier is called naive because it assumes that the probabilities
of any two terms appearing together are independent. This assumption seems
overly strong. For instance, the probability that the word "constitution" appears
in a document is higher if the word "framers" appears in the document. However,
it is a well-known property of the MNB classifier that the independence assumption-strong as it seems-tends to have negligible impact on the overall quality of
predictions. See, e.g., Harry Zhang, The Optimality of Naive Bayes, PROC. 17TH
INT'L FIA. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH Soc'Y CoNF. 562, 562 (2004) (investigating the "surprisingly good performance" of naive Bayes classifiers in many machine-learning applications).
92
In predicting a congressional speaker's political party, we remove the
132,157 documents (0.007% of the corpus) that identifiably originate neither from
Republicans nor from Democrats (for example, remarks by Independents). While
it is possible in principle to predict "third-party" affiliation, this would require the
training of a multilabel classifier. Multilabel classification is a significantly more
complex and less accurate task that does not allow for the implementation of our
preferred classifier. Because only 0.007% of documents originate from speakers
not from the two main political parties, we decided that the costs of this undertaking outweighed the benefits.
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and "true negative" classifications divided by the total number
of documents.9 3 The CCR is intuitively attractive and easy to
understand, but it can also be misleading because it can become skewed with unbalanced initial samples. Suppose, for
instance, that the test set contains ninety-nine spoken statements by Liberals and only one by a Conservative. A classifier
that simply labels every document "Liberal" would achieve a
CCR of 99% even though it always incorrectly classifies Conservative statements. Accordingly, it is common in the literature to complement the CCR with alternative performance
measures that are less vulnerable to such pitfalls.
The second performance metric is commonly known as Fi.
It is a performance measure that more comprehensively combines true positives, true negatives, false positives, and false
negatives into a single score.9 4 F, scores are bounded between
0 and 1, with higher numbers indicating higher classification
quality.
The third performance metric we employ is known as the
Area Under the Curve of the Receiver Operating Characteristic
function (AUC-ROC). This measure generalizes a step further,
by recognizing that the very definition of true/false positives/
negatives turns critically on the background criterion used to
map the classifier's probabilistic output onto a categorical assignment. For example, it seems intuitive to classify a document as "Conservative" if the MNB classifier returns a
probability of greater than 50% that the speaker is conservative
(and vice versa for "Liberal" assignments). Indeed, both CCR
and F, use this criterion. However, nothing is sacrosanct about
50%, and one could easily imagine using a 43% or 68% cutoff
instead if (say) one placed differential weights on the costs of
false positives versus false negatives. Each successive cutoff
would generate a different set of true/false positive/negative
rates and thus different CCR and F, measures. The ROC function sidesteps this problem by eschewing a single cutoff criterion and instead considering all of them. Specifically, the ROC
plots the true positive rate ("specificity") against the false positive rate (1 minus the "specificity") as one continuously moves
the cutoff criterion from 0% to 100%. In technical terms, the
93 To convert this standard statistical jargon into party classification, we
(arbitrarily) define a "true positive" (TP) as a correctly classified Republican docu-

ment, a "true negative" (TN) as a correctly classified Democratic document, a
"false positive" (FP) as a Democratic document classified as a Republican document, and a "false negative" (FN) as a Republican document classified as a Democratic document.
2 * TP
94 Formally, F, scores are defined by the expression: F = 2*TP+ FN+ FP.
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ROC curve represents a nonparametric indication of how well
the classifier can discriminate between speakers across assignment criteria. The AUC is bounded between 0 and 1, with
higher numbers again reflecting better overall classification.
In presenting our results, we typically show how our classifier performs on all three of these metrics over time, effectively
using each as an alternative lens through which to visualize the
polarization of constitutional discourse.
IV
MEASURING POLARIZATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE

This Part demonstrates that constitutional polarization, as
captured by the above-described measures, has exploded in
Congress over the past four decades. Based solely on the semantic content of a constitutional utterance made on the floor
of Congress, it has become increasingly easy for a machinelearning classifier to predict whether a Republican/conservative or a Democrat/liberal is speaking. This result is robust
across multiple classifiers, multiple tests of classifier performance, and multiple tests of what counts as constitutional rhetoric. On most measures, the polarization of constitutional
discourse is now every bit as extreme as the polarization of
nonconstitutional political discourse, if not more so.
A.

Qualitative Examples

Before turning to these empirical results, let us first offer a
peek into the contents of some of the documents they classify.
If constitutional discourse was so much less polarized in the
past than it is today, what did that sound like to listeners? Our
approach in this Article is in many ways the antithesis of a case
study, and detailed historical research would be needed to recover the texture and tenor of constitutional discourse in any
given era. Nevertheless, it may be helpful to consider some
illustrative examples of actual floor speeches, to give a feel for
the microlevel phenomena that underlie our macrolevel
results.
To do so, we generated probabilistic classifications of all
congressional documents triggering the Minimal dictionary
from 1959 to 1976 (earlier period) and, separately, from 1999
to 2016 (later period) on a spectrum ranging from most likely to
be Republican to most likely to be Democratic. We then extracted the ten documents closest to the average of all documents predicted to be Republican and to the average of all
documents predicted to be Democratic. That is, we looked at a
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sample of what might be considered the most generic or emblematic Republican and Democratic constitutional remarks
from each period.9 5
In the earlier period, several emblematic Democratic remarks express constitutional sentiments that today might be
thought to have a conservative cast. The most substantial remarks involved discussions: of the Supreme Court's "deeply
disturb[ing]" ruling in Engel v. Vitale9 6 that public schools may
not hold official recitations of prayers; 9 7 of the perils of military
assistance to Communist countries and the proposition that
"under the Constitution our foreign policies are the prerogative
of the President";9 8 of the inability of Congress to "exercise its
proper constitutional role" in the budgetmaking process owing
to "deceptive information, ground into pablum and spoon fed to
us by the [Office of Management and Budget]"; 9 9 and of the
"humiliating experience" for states such as Alabama of being
subject to the Voting Rights Act's preclearance regime and
thereby "convicted of discrimination without a trial."100
The emblematic constitutional remarks by Democrats in
the later period have a different tone and ideological valence.
They include discussions: of the nontreaty status of the North
American Free Trade Agreement and the Uruguay Round of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade;1 0 1 of the constitutional value of legislation to end federal raids on state-licensed
medical marijuana dispensaries;1 0 2 of the "audacity" and unfairness of Republican filibusters of President Obama's judicial
nominations; ' 0 3 and of how in the 2004 federal elections, unlike in the 2000 elections, "we are going to be prepared and we
are going to utilize every aspect of the Constitution, the Voting
to make
Rights Act of 1965, and local jurisdictional law ...
04
counted."
is
vote
sure that every
95 For the full results of this inquiry, see Pozen, Talley & Nyarko, Online App.,
supra note 5, at tbl. OA.2.
96 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
97 110 CONG. REc. 3404 (1964) (statement of Sen. A. Willis Robertson). Engel
is not named in Senator Robertson's remarks, but it is clearly the case he means
to criticize.
98
113 CONG. REc. 32,977 (1967) (statement of Rep. Otto Passman).
99
119 CONG. REC. 7740 (1973) (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie).
116 CONG. REC. 7105 (1970) (statement of Sen. James Allen).
100
101 145 CONG. REC. 20,154 (1999) (statement of Rep. Dennis J. Kucinich).
102 152 CONG. REc. 12,967 (2006) (statement of Rep. Maurice Hinchey).
103
160 CONG. REC. S1225 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2014) (statement of Sen. Harry
Reid).
104 150 CONG. REc. 18,491 (2004) (statement of Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee).
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In the earlier period, the emblematic Republican remarks
are diverse and not easy to characterize. They include recognizably "conservative" discussions of a state judge's "great affection for the Constitution and for the historic American
concept of freedom of the individual"; ' 0 5 and of the "doubt ...
in the minds of good lawyers as to the constitutionality" of Title
IV of the (never enacted) Civil Rights Act of 1966, which would
have barred racial discrimination in the sale and rental of all
housing. 0 6 Yet they also include harder-to-place discussions
of the importance of passing a law allowing eighteen-year-olds
to vote, notwithstanding the serious "constitutional questions"
raised by such a law; 10 7 and of the likely constitutionality and
"acceptab[ility] to many on both sides of the aisle" of the (never
enacted) Cooper-Church Amendment meant to bar reintroduction of U.S. armed forces into Cambodia, provided that the
that impugns the President's conamendment "do nothing ...
stitutional power as Commander in Chief." 1 0
The emblematic constitutional remarks by Republicans in
the later period are more uniform in their ideological content
and more combative in style. They include discussions: of how
"the framers of our Constitution wanted the process of lawmaking to be difficult" and "inefficient"; 0 9 of President Bush's opportunity and responsibility, as "Commander in Chief on the
domestic front," to call Congress into special session if it fails to
act on a stimulus bill before the 2001 winter recess;1 0 of how
opponents of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2003 give "the
impression that the interstate commerce clause was designed
to allow Congress to regulate all violent crime, and any other
subject that touches Congress's fancy and that happens to poll
well-any subject, that is, except for interstate commerce";"'
of George Mason's and James Madison's views on the selection
of House members;1 1 2 and of President Obama's "unconstitu-

105

106
107

106 CONG. REC. 1642 (1960) (statement of Sen. Barry Goldwater).
112 CONG. REc. 18,397 (1966) (statement of Rep. Gerald R. Ford).
116 CONG. REc. 20,166 (1970) (statement of Rep. Thomas Railsback). Later

that year, in Oregon v. Mitchel, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), a divided Supreme Court
would strike down the provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1970 lowering the
minimum voting age to eighteen in state and local elections.
116 CONG. REC. 19,186-87 (1970) (statement of Sen. Robert Dole).
108
109
110
111
112

145
147
149
150

CONG.
CONG.
CONG.
CONG.

REc.
REc.
REC.
REC.

14,973 (1999) (statement of Rep. David Dreier).
26,451 (2001) (statement of Rep. John Hayworth).
25,509-10 (2003) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl).
11,297 (2004) (statement of Rep. Tom Feeney).
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tional and unilateral decisions

. . .

to ignore our Constitu-

tion."113
These examples are illustrative only. But they give a sense
of what the polarization of constitutional discourse in Congress
might look like under a magnifying glass. As we show below,
these qualitative impressions persist when we zoom out to a
larger scale.
B.

Baseline Results

We now turn to our principal results. Figure 4 shows the
evolution of partisan polarization in Congress (as measured by
classifier performance) for constitutional versus nonconstitutional remarks, with any remark that triggers the Minimal dictionary treated as constitutional.
FIGURE

4:

PREDICTING PARTY AFFILIATION BY TEXTUAL CONTENT
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161 CONG. REC. H1550 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2015) (statement of Rep. Jody B.
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The horizontal axis plots time in two-year increments, corresponding to each Congress since 1873. The vertical axis plots,
in each successive panel, the three different metrics that we
use to assess our classifier's performance: from left to right,
CCR, F, scores, and AUC-ROC.11 4 Each dot in the figure represents an average performance score for constitutional or nonconstitutional remarks in that Congress. To facilitate
interpretation, we also fit each set of dots with "smoothed"
LOWESS-curve trend lines and associated 95% confidence
bands around the lines. 1 1 5
A few aspects of these results immediately stand out. First,
they lend little support to the notion that framing arguments in
constitutional terms tends to discipline disagreement and
dampen partisanship.1 1 6 On the contrary, congressional remarks that invoke the Constitution appear to be even more
polarized than those that do not. Second, the polarization of
congressional discourse has grown dramatically since the late
1970s for both constitutional and nonconstitutional remarks.
And third, the growth rate of constitutional polarization has
tended to equal or exceed the growth rate of nonconstitutional
polarization.
Beginning around 1980, our classifier thus finds it increasingly easy to predict the political party of a congressional
speaker. As noted in Part I, the Democratic and Republican
parties have become more internally unified and externally divided during this period.'1 It is possible that the increasing
ideological coherence of the parties is itself driving Figure 4's
results: even if "liberal" and "conservative" members of Congress sound exactly as distinct from each other as they did
before, Figure 4's results could trend upward because all of the
liberals have been leaving the Republican Party for the Democratic Party and vice versa. Another (not mutually exclusive)
See supra subpart III.B.
Alternatively, confidence intervals could be obtained through bootstrapping. In this case, however, a full bootstrapping process is computationally very
intensive and takes several months to complete. We have conducted a preliminary test with fewer observations and were able to confirm that the recent increase in polarization is significant. Results on the full data set will be included in
the Online Appendix as they become available.
116
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
117
See supranote 22 and accompanying text; see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen,
Executive FederalismComes to America, 102 VA. L. REv. 953, 958 (2016) (explaining that while in the mid-twentieth century the "Democratic and Republican
parties were internally diverse confederations," today they "are instead sharply
polarized" and "partisanship and ideology have become closely aligned"); id. at
958 nn. 12-14 (collecting political science sources documenting this
transformation).
114

115
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possibility, however, is that liberal and conservative legislators
have been speaking in increasingly distinctive ways.
Figure 5 tries to tease apart these alternative narratives by
showing our classifier's performance at predicting the political
ideology of a congressional speaker independent of party affiliation. For this purpose, we use Poole-Rosenthal (PR) scores,
which are designed to capture the ideological leanings of each
member of Congress based on her voting behavior.' 1 8 We label
each speaker "liberal" or "conservative" depending on the relative position of her PR score within the distribution of her temporal peers. A speaker is labeled liberal if her PR score lies to
the left of the median PR score of her chamber in a given Congress; a speaker is labeled conservative if her PR score lies to
the right of the median." 9 Our classifier then predicts the
speaker's ideology without reference to party.

118 See supra note 67 and accompanying text. More precisely, we use the first
dimension of PR scores based on the dynamic, weighted nominal three-step esti-

/

mation procedure known as DW-NOMINATE. See Royce Carroll, Jeff Lewis,
James Lo, Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole & Howard Rosenthal, DW-NOMINATE
Scores with Bootstrapped StandardErrors,VOTEvIEw.oRG (Sept. 17, 2015), http: /

www.voteview.org/dwnomin.htm [https://perma.cc/W5NF-9APC]. We do not
use the second (subsidiary) dimension of PR scores, as it has been of little help in
&

classifying ideology since the late 1960s. See NOLAN McCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE
HOwARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL

RICHES 26 (2006) ("From the late 1960s onward, ... the second dimension has
abruptly declined in importance. In the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush eras, it
improves classification only by about one percent.").
119 Consequently, the labels are dynamic in that an individual's status as a
"liberal" or "conservative" could change over time if the median legislator in her
chamber moves to the right or the left.
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5: PREDICTING LIBERAL/CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY BY
TEXTUAL CONTENT
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The results in Figure 5 largely parallel the results in Figure
4. Both constitutional remarks and nonconstitutional remarks
have become dramatically more polarized in recent decades,
and the polarization of the former has, if anything, been more
extreme. This suggests that the partisan polarization shown in
Figure 4 is not simply a function of the parties' post-1960s
realignment (with liberals fleeing the Republican Party and
conservatives fleeing the Democratic Party). Rather, the partisan polarization shown in Figure 4 has been driven to some
significant extent by the growing distinctiveness of liberal versus conservative speech.
In creating Figures 4 and 5, we do not control for any
attributes of the underlying documents. One might harbor
concerns that the constitutional and nonconstitutional documents differ in ways that are unrelated to the constitutional/
nonconstitutional distinction yet still affect our classifier's performance. In particular, longer texts-simply by dint of their
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length-tend to provide more opportunities for a classifier to
identify distinctive phrases or patterns of speech that are predictive of ideology or party. And constitutional documents
might tend to be longer because, for example, they are less
likely to involve merely procedural or commemorative content.
FIGURE 6: MEAN DOCUMENT LENGTH OVER TIME
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Figure 6 suggests that this concern is warranted. The lefthand panel shows a time-series plot of the average length of
constitutional documents and nonconstitutional documents.
While the average length of constitutional documents fluctuates between 500 and 1300 words per Congress, the average
length of nonconstitutional documents fluctuates between 100
and 300 words. It therefore seems plausible that our protocol
for identifying constitutional subject matter inadvertently introduces a spurious factor (length) that affects our measure of
polarization. That said, whether length should be considered
spurious here is open to debate, insofar as the choice to give a
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longer-than-usual speech on the floor of Congress and the
choice to invoke the Constitution while doing so may be causally related to one another-for instance, because constitutional arguments take more time to elaborate or because efforts
to advance arguments that are (or appear) especially serious or
scholarly are more likely to invoke the Constitution toward that
end.
While some might therefore believe it better not to control
for length, to address any concerns on this score we resample
our data using a matching technique designed to eliminate
differences between constitutional and nonconstitutional documents based on length. Our protocol for doing so is as follows. For every document deemed constitutional, we match it
with a nonconstitutional document from the same Congress
that has the same word count. If there is no nonconstitutional
document with the exact same word count, we choose the one
that is closest; 120 if there are multiple matching nonconstitutional documents of equal length, we select one at random.
Nonconstitutional documents that are never matched are
dropped from the analysis. The right-hand panel of Figure 6
illustrates differences in word length after matching. As can be
seen, matching successfully removes any meaningful differences in length between constitutional and nonconstitutional
documents. We then rerun the analyses behind Figures 4 and
5 on the length-matched data set. Figure 7 shows the results.
(Figure 7A corresponds to Figure 4; Figure 7B corresponds to
Figure 5.)
Controlling for document length, it turns out, does not significantly alter our qualitative findings. As before, both constitutional and nonconstitutional remarks have grown
increasingly polarized since around 1980. And as before, the
rate at which constitutional remarks have become polarized is
at least as high as the rate for nonconstitutional remarks. Intriguingly, these length-controlled comparisons suggest that
polarization historically has been lower in constitutional discourse than in nonconstitutional discourse, but that in recent
decades this gap has disappeared or slightly reversed. In short,
controlling for document length not only substantiates our
baseline results but also makes them appear even starker in
certain respects.
120 This nonconstitutional document could be slightly longer or shorter than
the constitutional document with which it is matched. We choose the nonconstitutional document that minimizes the absolute difference in word count.
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7: PREDICTING SPEAKERS BY TEXTUAL CONTENT
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Robustness Checks Using Different Dictionaries

As an additional means to check the robustness of our
results, we employ alternative tests for distinguishing between
constitutional and nonconstitutional documents. Up to this
point (in Figures 4, 5, and 7), we have deemed a document
constitutional if and only if it contains a variant of the term
"constitution" and thus triggers the Minimal dictionary. This
baseline approach has much to commend it in terms of transparency, replicability, and simplicity, as described in subpart
III.A, but it reflects a narrow conception of constitutional discourse. Accordingly, we explore the possibility that changing
the test for what counts as constitutional subject matter
changes the ultimate portrait of polarization.
Figure 8 shows the results of rerunning the analysis with
the Extended Textual dictionary and three different cutoff criteria for identifying constitutional subject matter. The Extended
Textual dictionary, recall, includes not only the term "constitution" but also the titles of constitutional articles, amendments,
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and clauses as well as dozens of phrases that appear in the text
of the Constitution and lack a common extraconstitutional usage. 1 2 1 In all of the analyses for Figure 8, we use the lengthmatched data set, controlling for document length across constitutional and nonconstitutional remarks. The top row of Figure 8 shows our classifier's performance, as measured by CCR,
at predicting a speaker's political party. The bottom row shows
its performance at predicting a speaker's liberal/conservative
ideology. Within each row, the left-hand panel shows the results when we deem a document constitutional if any term in
the Extended Textual dictionary appears in it. The center and
right-hand panels show the results when we increase the cutoff
criterion to the conditional median and the conditional eighth
decile of p scores, respectively, such that a document is deemed
constitutional only if its density of constitutional content is in
the top half or top fifth of all documents that trigger the Extended Textual dictionary.

121

See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
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FIGURE

8: RESULTS WITH EXTENDED TEXTUAL DICTIONARY (LENGTHMATCHED DATA)
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The results in Figure 8 are broadly consistent with the
results in Figure 7. The left-hand panels show the same explosive growth in polarization, and especially constitutional polarization, since around 1980. The one significant difference
between Figure 7 and Figure 8 appears in the right-hand
panels, which show the recent rate of polarization of constitutional discourse lagging rather than equaling or exceeding that
of nonconstitutional discourse. The discrepancy between the
left-hand and right-hand panels in Figure 8 is intriguing. It
suggests that whereas relatively superficial discussions of the
Constitution tend to be more partisan than remarks that have
zero constitutional content, particularly detailed discussions of
the Constitution may bear fewer markers of partisanship.
Using a broader dictionary also facilitates other types of
diagnostic measures for polarization that are not possible with
the Minimal dictionary. In particular, a broader dictionary al-
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lows us to compare how Democrats and Republicans differentially draw on various terms. Figure 9 explores this alternative
indicator of polarization using the Extended Textual dictionary
(left-hand charts) and the Expansive dictionary (right-hand
charts). For each term in the dictionary and for each Congress,
we compute the average frequency with which the term appears in remarks made by Democrats versus the average frequency with which the term appears in remarks made by
Republicans. In Figure 9A, we plot the average absolute difference between Democratic and Republican usage across all
terms in each dictionary, thereby generating a measure of "disjointness" in how the political parties invoke these terms.
Under this measure, a higher score indicates a greater degree
of disjointness in the parties' use of constitutional rhetoric. In
Figure 9B, we consider an alternative measure of the extent to
which Democrats and Republicans differentially draw on a dictionary's terms: the "cosine similarity" between the parties' use
of all terms in each dictionary. Under this measure, a lower
score indicates greater polarization (patterns of speech that are
more dissimilar). 1 2 2 All charts plot time series of the relevant
scores, by Congress.
FIGURE

9A.

9: TALKING PAST EACH OTHER

Average Absolute Differences
Expansive Dictionary

Extended Textual Dictionary
1.2
S0.8

0.9

>0.6

0.6

Q0.4

0

0.3

0.2

1900

1940
Year

1980

1900

1940
Year

1980

122
More technically, to compute cosine similarity we first translate the corpus
into a document-term matrix, where the rows represent the documents and the
columns represent the counts of terms. Doing this allows each document to be
represented as a vector of term counts, and the similarity between two documents
can be captured by the vector cosine of the angle between the documents' vector
representations.
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As these charts show, there have been several historical
periods in which the constitutional rhetoric used by Democrats
and Republicans became increasingly distinct on one or both
measures, including the 1930s and 1960s. The levels of disjointness/dissimilarity during those periods, however, pale in
comparison to the levels reached during the past several decades. Indeed, all four plots in Figure 9 suggest that Democratic and Republican members of Congress are talking past
each other in their constitutionalrhetoric to a greaterextent than
they ever have since the beginning of our data set in 1873.
V
ONE DOCUMENT, TWO DISCOURSES: WHAT DRIVES
CONSTITUTIONAL POLARIZATION?

The previous Part documents the growing polarization of
constitutional discourse in Congress over the past four decades. Our findings are robust across multiple constitutional
dictionaries, classification metrics, ideology proxies, and imputation rules for constitutional subject matter. These findings
are dramatic, unsettling, and the core of this Article's
contribution.
What has been driving the trends that Part IV documents?
Teasing out the causes of a phenomenon as complex as constitutional polarization requires sustained multidisciplinary
study, but our research design enables us to make some headway. In particular, we analyze interactions in the data to assess: (1) whether polarization has increased symmetrically or
asymmetrically across the two parties; (2) whether the prevalence of constitutional rhetoric is related to unified or divided
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government; (3) whether the introduction of television coverage
of the House and Senate floors has had any appreciable effect
on polarization; and (4) whether certain constitutional terms
have become increasingly associated with Democrats or
Republicans. We discuss each topic in turn.
Asymmetric Constitutional Polarization
Consider first the possibility that one political party has
been more responsible than the other for the uptick in constitutional polarization. As noted above, legal scholars and political scientists continue to debate whether and to what extent
the recent rise in partisan polarization and constitutional hardball has been driven, asymmetrically, by Republicans over
Democrats. 123 Qualitative analyses of such phenomena may
be subject to any number of subjective biases.1 2 4 Our methods, while no doubt imperfect in various ways, provide an alternative lens through which to assess the asymmetry question.
A.

See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
See Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 24, at 927-29; Bernstein, supra note 32,
at 208-11. But cf. Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Evaluating Constitutional
Hardball Two Fallacies and a Research Agenda, 119 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 158
(2019) (defending the use of qualitative methods to study patterns and practices
of constitutional hardball).
123
124
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FIGURE

10: PR SCORES AND PREDICTED CONSERVATISM
1999-2016
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Figure 10 illustrates the relationship between the political
ideology of congressional speakers (as measured by PR scores)
and the polarization of their remarks on the House and Senate
floors (as measured by our classifier's predictions as to whether
a conservative is speaking). It compares two historical periods:
one from 1959 to 1976 when levels of polarization were relatively low, and one from 1999 to 2016 when levels of polarization were relatively high. The charts in the top row of Figure 10
are based on remarks deemed to be nonconstitutional. The
charts in the bottom row are based on remarks deemed to be
constitutional under our baseline test (that the Minimal dictionary is triggered). The horizontal axis plots PR score intervals across all members of Congress, with the vertical dotted
line indicating the "neutral" score of 0.
The charts in Figure 10 each contain two diagrams. First,
the dash-dotted lines depict the underlying frequency distribution (or smoothed histograms) of PR scores for Congresses
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within the period. Note that in both periods this distribution is
bimodal, although more so in 1999-2016, reflecting the virtual
disappearance of political neutrals. Second, and most importantly for our purposes, the solid lines depict the average likelihood that the speaker is predicted by our classifier to be
conservative based solely on the text of her remarks. When
this solid line is steep, it suggests a tight relationship between
speakers' ideology as reflected in their voting record and their
ideology as reflected in the "conservativeness" of their remarks.
A flatter line, in contrast, suggests a noisier relationship between voting behavior and rhetoric.
For nonconstitutional remarks (the upper charts), we see
ideology and rhetoric becoming more closely aligned from the
earlier period to the later period for both liberals and conservatives, as the slope of the solid line increases across all members
of Congress. For constitutional remarks (the lower charts), we
see a similar shift toward greater alignment of ideology and
rhetoric, but with a significant asymmetric twist. In the earlier
period, conservative speakers of all stripes tend to engage in
relatively homogenous constitutional discourse (lower left
chart, PR scores above zero). In the later period depicted in the
lower right chart, however, conservative speakers become
much more distinguishable by ideology, with relatively extreme
conservatives (with the highest PR scores) employing a much
more distinctive constitutional rhetoric than relatively moderate conservatives (with the lowest positive PR scores). Among
liberals (lower charts, PR scores below zero), in contrast, the
mapping between ideology and constitutional rhetoric shifts
only trivially across the measured time spans. These patterns
suggest that it is conservatives in Congress-and in particular
the most conservative conservatives-who have been driving
the recent uptick in polarization of constitutional discourse.
Although this shift is a stark one even for visual analysis, it
also manifests in both statistically and behaviorally significant
ways using a "regression-kink" analysis, as described in Appendix B. 1 2 5
That said, Figure 10 also suggests that at least part of the
reason for this asymmetric-polarization result is that extreme
conservatives have caught up to extreme liberals in the distinctiveness of their constitutional rhetoric. As the lower left chart
shows, from 1959 to 1976 the most liberal liberals were already
easy to identify as such through the text of their constitutional
125

See infra App. B, tbl. B.1.
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remarks. The lower right chart shows that this remains the
case.
The overall portrait painted by Figure 10 is thus a nuanced
one. Consistent with the "asymmetric polarization" and "asymmetric constitutional hardball" theses, our findings strongly
support the notion that developments within the Republican
coalition have been responsible for the post- 1970s rise in constitutional polarization-but with the important caveat that
these asymmetric developments have made the degree of fit
between political ideology and constitutional rhetoric more
symmetric across the historical liberal/conservative divide.
The big change from 1959-1976 to 1999-2016, again, is that
the constitutional remarks made by the most extreme conservatives in Congress used to be hard to distinguish from the
constitutional remarks made by the most moderate conservatives, and now the two are relatively easy to differentiate.
B.

Separation of Parties, Not Powers

Thus far, we have analyzed constitutional polarization in
Congress without reference to which party holds power. The
"separation of parties, not powers" thesis advanced by Levinson and Pildes, however, suggests that "the degree and kind of
competition between the legislative and executive branches
vary significantly .. . depending on whether the House, Senate,
and presidency are divided or unified by political party."l 2 6
Members of Congress from the same political party as the president, Levinson and Pildes emphasize, are more likely to approach interbranch interactions in a "cooperative" rather than
a "competitive" manner.1 2 7
In line with this thesis, members of Congress whose party
does not hold the presidency may tend to invoke the Constitution more frequently than their counterparts across the aisle,
as part of their efforts to resist the president's agenda and
generate the "friction" necessary "to save the people" from perceived executive overreach.1 2 8 For similar reasons, members of
Congress who are in the minority party within their chamber
may tend to invoke the Constitution more frequently, as part of
their efforts to resist the majority party's agenda. Levinson and
Levinson & Pildes, supra note 1, at 2315.
Id at 2316.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted .. . not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to
avoid friction, but . .. to save the people from autocracy.").
126
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Pildes's descriptive account has been challenged by some,'1 2 9
and its implications for constitutional discourse might be debated. But it seems to suggest the possibility that public appeals to the Constitution in Congress serve less as a rhetoric of
justification or aspiration, wielded by those in power to help
explain or defend their policies, and more as a rhetoric of opposition wielded by those who find themselves on the political
margins.
Figure 11 probes this possibility, illustrating the propensity of Democrats and Republicans to invoke the Constitution
or any of its provisions or phrases (the Extended Textual dictionary) in their remarks on the floor, conditional on whether
the presidency (top row) or their legislative chamber (bottom
row) is controlled by their own party or the other party. The
gaps in the smoothed lines represent Congresses in which the
relevant condition does not apply. For instance, in the top left
chart on Republican presidencies, the gaps represent periods
in which a Democrat was in the White House. In the bottom
row, the charts can have anywhere from zero to four dots per
Congress, depending on how many of the relevant conditions
are met. For instance, in the 103rd Congress beginning in
1993, Democrats controlled both the House and Senate, so in
the bottom right chart (majority Democratic chambers) there
are four dots: one for Democrats in the House, one for Democrats in the Senate, one for Republicans in the House, and one
for Republicans in the Senate. In the 104th Congress beginning in 1995, by contrast, Republicans controlled both chambers, so there are zero dots that year in the bottom right chart
and four in the bottom left chart.

129

See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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FIGURE 11: COUNTERMAJORITARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL RHETORIC
(EXTENDED TEXTUAL DICTIONARY)
Democratic President

-

0.050-

h4_

0.025

-

o

0.075

-

0.000
0

1900

0.025

0.000

4
1900

2016

1980

1940

Maj. Republican Chamber

*

~*

-

0.050

-

0.075

-

Republican President

1940

1980

2016

Maj. Democratic Chamber
0.075

-

0.075-

I
%'

0.025

-

0.025- *4*.~~*

0.050

-

0.050-

01.
0.000

-

-

0.000

1900

1980

1940
-

1900

2016

Republicans

-

1940

1980

2016

Democrats

The overall trends in Figure 11 suggest a mild tendency for
members of Congress whose party is out of power, either in the
sense of not controlling the presidency or not controlling their
own chamber, to invoke the Constitution more frequently than
their counterparts across the aisle. But both the magnitude
and the partisan skew of this tendency vary significantly across
historical eras. In the early twentieth century, another period
of high partisan polarization in Congress, 1 3 0 Democrats were
especially likely to appeal to the Constitution when out of
power. During much of the mid-twentieth century, countermajoritarian propensities to invoke the constitution were far
weaker (and in some cases reversed). Over the past four decades or so, however, the earlier pattern reemerged-but with
minority-party Republicans becoming the most intensive invokers of the Constitution. During the Obama Administration,
130
See Keith T. Poole, Howard Rosenthal & Christopher Hare, House and
Senate PolarLzation 1879-2014, VOTEVIEW BLOG (Dec. 22, 2014), https://voteview

blog.com/2014/12/22/house-and-senate-polarization-1879-2014
perma.cc/LK65-3KHQ].
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they mentioned the Constitution in an unprecedentedly high
proportion of their remarks.
In terms of how often members of Congress discuss the
Constitution (Figure 11), as well as what they say when they do
(Figures 4 through 10), partisan discrepancies have thus become both increasingly clear and increasingly asymmetric. In
Appendix B, we further document these differential patterns
13
across historical eras using regression analysis techniques.
C.

Polarization by Chamber and the C-SPAN Effect

The analyses described in the previous subparts pool the
two chambers of Congress together. This pooling helps us to
see general trends, but it might also mask important variations
across the chambers. Traditionally, the Senate has been perceived as a more deliberative and compromise-oriented body
than the House of Representatives.1 3 2 In recent years, however, "most scholars find that the political parties have polarized almost as much in the Senate as they have in the
House" in terms of voting behavior.' 3 3 Do our textual measures of constitutional polarization exhibit similar tendencies?
To explore this question, we reran the analyses behind
Figure 7A-predicting party affiliation using the lengthmatched data set-for each chamber separately. The results
appear in Figure 12. For purposes of illustrative clarity, it
shows classifier performance for constitutional documents only
(with all documents that trigger the Minimal dictionary deemed
constitutional). As is immediately apparent from Figure 12,
constitutional discourse has become significantly more polarized in both chambers since around 1980, and levels of polarization are now very similar across the two chambers under
all three measures of classifier performance. Interestingly,
however, our results do not reveal greater polarization in the
131

See infra App. B, tbl. B.2.

132

See DONALD R. MATTHEWS, U.S. SENATORS AND THEIR WORLD 5 (1960) (noting

that the U.S. Senate "proudly calls itself the greatest deliberative body in the
world"); Julia L. Ernst, The CongressionalCaucusfor Women's Issues: An Inside
Perspective on Lawmaking by and for Women, 12 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 189, 245

n. 168 (2006) ("The culture of the two chambers is known to be vastly different,
with the Senate generally seen as the more genteel, refined, deliberative, broadminded body favoring consultation and compromise . . . ."). But cf. Daniel Wirls,
The "GoldenAge" Senate and FloorDebate in the Antebellum Congress, 32 LEGIS.
STUD.

Q.

193, 194 (2007) (using case studies to demonstrate that the "House

debated as long, and arguably as well, as the Senate on the signal issues of the
day" in the antebellum period).
133 Sean M. Theriault & David W. Rohde, The Gingrich Senators and Party
Polarization in the U.S. Senate, 73 J. POL. 1011, 1011 (2011).
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House in the pre-1980 period. To the contrary, on two of our
three measures, constitutional remarks in the House were consistently less polarized than constitutional remarks in the Senate from 1873 to 1980, even as both have reached
unprecedentedly high levels of polarization in recent decades.
FIGURE

12: PARTISAN CONSTITUTIONAL POLARIZATION IN THE HOUSE
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Separating out the chambers is also useful for investigating another possible factor driving the polarization of constitutional discourse, involving what some have called the "C-SPAN
effect."i1 4 Over the course of the 1970s, the decade immediately preceding the recent surge in polarization, both houses of
134

See, e.g., Mark J. Rozell & Richard J. Semiatin, Congress and the News

Media, in MEDIA POWER, MEDIA POLITICS 43, 51 (Mark J. Rozell & Jeremy D. Mayer

eds., 2d ed. 2008); Philip Joyce, The Dark Side of Government in the Sunshine,
GOVERNING (May 6, 2015), http://www.governing.com/columns/smart-mgmt/col
-dark-side-transparency-government.html [https://perma.cc/AJ7M-2E6F]. See
generally STEPHEN FRANICH & JOHN SULLIVAN, THE C-SPAN REVOLUTION (1996).
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Congress made a series of procedural reforms intended to enhance the visibility of their work to the public.1 3 5 A growing
number of scholars have suggested that this increase in transparency may have contributed to an increase in institutional
discord and dysfunction-for instance, "by preventing legislators from deviating from party messages and by interfering with
the good-faith search for multidimensional solutions"1 36 -although precise causal influences remain difficult to establish.
Of particular relevance for a study of discourse on the House
and Senate floors, scholars have pointed to the congressionally
authorized creation of the C-SPAN cable network, which airs
live broadcasts of all floor proceedings, as a critical inflection
point in the direction of a more performative, soundbite-driven
style of legislative debate. 137
Our data permit one avenue for testing the C-SPAN effect,
taking advantage of its staggered introduction, first in the
House (on March 19, 1979) and seven years later in the Senate
(on June 2, 1986).1388 A staggered "shock" of this sort can be a
helpful device for causal identification, as it allows us to use
the Senate as a control group for the House's early treatment
(in 1979) and to use the House as a control group for the
Senate's late treatment (in 1986). We can then conduct what is
135 See David E. Pozen, Transparency'sIdeological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100,
130-32 (2018) (discussing these reforms). For a variety of reasons related and
unrelated to these reforms, the floors of both chambers became "far more important arenas of substantive policymaking" during the 1960s and especially the
1970s than they had been during the early-to-mid twentieth century. SMITH,
supra note 61, at 1.
Pozen, supranote 135, at 132; see also id. at 130-33 (reviewing the critical
136
literature on legislative transparency).
137
See, e.g., FRANKLIN G. MIXON, JR. & KAMAL P. UPADHYAYA, LEGISLATIVE TELEVISION AS POLITICAL ADVERTISING: A PUBLIC CHOICE APPROACH 47 (2003) (discussing

evidence that "the presence of legislative television at the federal level has increased the value [to legislators] of . .. grandstanding and posturing on salient
political issues"); Jonathan S. Morris, Reexamining the Politics of Talk: Partisan
Rhetoric in the 104th House, 26 LEG. STUD. Q. 101, 114-15 (2001) ("ITIhis study
has shown that members of Congress make attempts to appeal to [the C-SPAN]
audience by instituting their own version of the legislative sound bite."); Edward
H. Stiglitz & Aviv Caspi, Observability and Reasoned Discourse: Evidence from the
U.S. Senate 3-4 (Mar. 21, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors)
(finding that the introduction of C-SPAN led to greater discursive "herding" among
senators from the same party and to a significant decrease in "the amount of time
[spent] debating live bills and resolutions" versus "posturing for constituents");
see also Susan Davis, Not Everyone Is a Fanof C-SPAN Camerasin Congress, USA
TODAY (Mar. 19, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/
03/19/cspan-anniversary/6577593 [https://perma.cc/AF6X-LW4U] (quoting
Representative Don Young for the view that C-SPAN is "probably the worst thing
that happened to the Congress").
138

See SARAH J. ECKMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44665, VIDEO BROADCASTING

OF CONGRESSIONAL PROCEEDINGS 5-10 (2017).
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commonly known as a difference-in-differences analysis based
on our simplest measure of discursive polarization (CCR) between the House and Senate, both before and after the introduction of C-SPAN. Some illustrations of this approach are
presented in Figure 13. For this analysis, we again use the
length-matched data set described in subpart IV.B and deem
documents constitutional if they trigger the Minimal dictionary. The smoothed lines in the left-hand chart and the middle
chart track the difference in CCR over time between the House
and Senate (House CCR - Senate CCR). The left-hand chart
shows this difference for constitutional remarks; the middle
chart shows it for nonconstitutional remarks. The right-hand
chart plots the difference over time between the left-hand
chart's results and the middle chart's results. The vertical
dotted lines represent the introduction dates of C-SPAN in the
House and Senate.
FIGURE

13: C-SPAN AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLARIZATION
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Dashed vertical lines indicate the introduction of C-SPAN in the House and Senate

Figure 13 reveals that after the introduction of C-SPAN1 in
the House, the relative CCR for constitutional remarks in that
chamber increased slightly, and then declined following CSPAN2's introduction in the Senate. This pattern is consistent
with the notion that television coverage of floor proceedings
helped foster a more polarized constitutional rhetoric.
Nevertheless, we interpret this result cautiously for a number of reasons. First, C-SPAN's staggered introduction in the
House and Senate was not an exogenous shock, and it is possible that certain members of the House voted in 1979 in favor of
video coverage because they were willing or eager to speak on
the floor in a more partisan manner. Second, the magnitude of
movement in relative CCR is small, well inside historical fluctuations. Third, as the regression results in Appendix B demon-
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strate, the evidence supporting a C-SPAN effect does not
appear to hold across standard statistical robustness
checks.1 3 9 Fourth, as the middle chart shows, we do not observe a comparable effect for nonconstitutional documents
even though transparency plausibly functions similarly in both
contexts. 1 4 0 And fifth, for a difference-in-differences strategy to
be reliable, the treatment and control groups must have exhibited parallel trends prior to the initial shock. As the leftmost
set of dots on each chart reflects, however, pre-1979 partisanship levels in the House and Senate exhibit significant volatility
(for both constitutional and nonconstitutional documents). Although our results are consistent with the hypothesis that
cable news coverage contributed to the polarization of constitutional discourse, we are unable to measure such an effect with
4
much statistical confidence.1 1
D.

The Vocabulary of Constitutional Partisanship

Finally, our data set can shed light on the polarization of
constitutional discourse by allowing us to study patterns of
usage of particular expressions. As explained above, legal
scholars have argued that Democratic and Republican officials
have become increasingly attached to distinct constitutional
themes and tropes over the past four decades, as exemplified
by the rise of "originalism" on the Republican side.1 4 2 Although
aggregate trends in polarization are more rigorously assessed
through the methods employed in Part IV, this scholarship
139 See infra App. B, tbl. B.3. Most notably, the effects of C-SPAN1 and CSPAN2 are statistically significant in a model without speaker fixed effects, but
they largely disappear once we add speaker fixed effects. Although one can certainly debate the appropriateness of including speaker fixed effects in this context, as explained in Appendix B, it nonetheless remains appropriate to interpret
these results with caution.

140 This finding is broadly consistent with Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Taddy's
working paper, which does not attempt to exploit the staggered introduction of CSPAN in the House and Senate, but which finds little indication in its time-series

trends that C-SPAN was "the proximate cause of increased partisanship" in the
1980s and 1990s (although it may well have "provided an important complement
to linguistic innovation"). Gentzkow, Shapiro & Taddy, supra note 9, at 25.

141 It is possible that the C-SPAN effect we observe is dampened due to the
limited availability of cable television in some regions of the United States while
the Federal Communications Commission was gradually deregulating the cable
industry beginning in the 1970s. See generally Stanley M. Besen & Robert W.
Crandall, The Deregulationof Cable Television, 44 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS., no. 1,

1981, at 77. Rather than exploiting the staggered introduction of C-SPAN in the
House and the Senate, future work might use the staggered introduction of cable
television across different members' voting districts as a shock that allows for a
convincing identification strategy.

142

See supranotes 23-24, 33-37 and accompanying text.
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suggests that it is worthwhile to look into some especially salient terms that may be doing outsized work in differentiating
the parties' contemporary constitutional rhetoric.
Figures 14A and 14B display word clouds associated with
the utilization of terms in our broadest constitutional dictionary, the Expansive dictionary, for two historical periods: 1959
to 1976 and 1999 to 2016. The earlier period predates the
recent surge in polarization of constitutional discourse; the
later period captures the surge at its apex. Figure 14A shows
the fifty most distinctive terms regardless of party in congressional floor remarks from each period, with size scaled to a
term's distinctiveness. 143 In other words, these are the fifty
constitutionally freighted terms that are most strongly "owned"
by one particular party during the years in question. Figure
14B offers a slight twist on Figure 14A. It shows the twenty-five
most distinctive terms of each party, again with a total of fifty
terms (this time half owned by Democrats, half owned by
Republicans) and again with size scaled to a term's distinctiveness (relative to other terms owned by the same party). Figure
14C replicates the analysis of 14A for the Obama presidency
specifically, the last full presidency for which we have data. All
terms in all word clouds are color-coded based on which party
uses the term most frequently. Dark font signifies Democraticowned terms; pale font signifies Republican-owned terms.
FIGURE

14A: FIFTY MoST DISTINCTIVE TERmS ACROSS PARTIES,
EXPANSIVE DICTIONARY
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"Distinctiveness" refers to the difference in the relative frequency with
which a term is used across the two major parties. For instance, if Republicans
use a term ten times for every 10,000 words they speak, whereas Democrats use it
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FIGURE 14B: TWENTY-FIVE MOST DISTINCTIVE TERMS OF EACH

PARTY, EXPANSIVE DICTIONARY
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Without hyperbole, we think it is fair to say that these
results are stunning. In the 1959-1976 period, Figure 14A
shows, congressional Democrats had a far more distinctive and
robust constitutional vocabulary than Republicans did. In the
1999-20 16 period, the opposite was true-with the important
exceptions that the terms "civil rights" and "voting rights" remained squarely in the Democratic fold. Put (overly) simply,

Democrats used to dominate constitutional discourse. Now
Republicans do.
The specific content of the word clouds is interesting as
well. (For those readers who wish to see a much more detailed
visual record of the history of constitutional discourse in Congress, the Online Appendix contains comparable word clouds

for every Congress in our data set.144) InVOcation of the "first
144

Pozen, Talley & Nyarko, Online App., supra note 5, at figs. OA. 1-2.
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amendment," to take just one term, flips from being primarily a
Democratic practice to primarily a Republican practice between the two periods-a dramatic demonstration of ideological drift.1 4 5 More broadly, whereas terms associated with the
Framers' Constitution have become strongly associated with
the contemporary Republican Party, terms associated with the
Reconstruction Amendments have become strongly associated
with the contemporary Democratic Party-a dramatic demonstration of the "constant," and now highly partisan, "struggle"
in constitutional politics "between the values of the Founding
and the values of Reconstruction."' 4 6
Figure 15 fleshes out these observations a bit further. It
traces the evolution over time of Democratic and Republican
usage of a select set of notable terms for every million words
spoken: "first amendment," "second amendment," "tenth
amendment," "equal protection," "fourteenth amendment," and
the combined set of terms in our Originalism dictionary (described in subpart III.A1 4 7 and reproduced in full in Appendix
A). The selection of these terms on which to focus is inherently
arbitrary at some level, but it is nonetheless instructive as to
the phrase-level drivers of discursive polarization.

145

This demonstration is consistent with the qualitative First Amendment

literature.

See, e.g., Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, The Search for an

EgalitarianFirst Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REv. 1953, 1969 (2018) ("Cases in

which 'individuals or groups commonly thought of as "conservative" took up the
First Amendment cudgels against regulatory forces supported by individuals or
groups commonly thought to be "liberals"' began to multiply in the late 1970s and
1980s, both in the economic realm and beyond.") (quoting Frederick Schauer, The
Political Incidence of the Free Speech Principle, 64 U. CoLo. L. REV. 935, 941
(1993)).
146
Kermit Roosevelt III, Reconstruction and Resistance, 91 TEx. L. REV. 121,
141 (2012); see also Pozen, supranote 26, at 927 (noting that while "[clonservative

commentators routinely depict interpretive approaches associated with left-liberas tainted by imperfect loyalty to the canonical document" or "the Framals ...
ers," a parallel "strain of commentary on the political left accuses conservatives of
refusing to accept the full scope of constitutional change wrought by the Reconstruction Amendments"). "The Founding," according to Kermit Roosevelt, "stands

for individual liberty, for limited federal power, for the ability of states to run their
internal affairs as they see fit." Roosevelt, supra, at 141-42. "Reconstruction
stands for equality, for broader federal authority, for federal rights and federal
laws protecting individuals from their own states." Id. at 142.
147 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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FIGURE 15: PARTISAN DISCREPANCIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE
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These results largely speak for themselves. Ownership of
"first amendment" began to switch parties in the 1980s. Democrats no longer own the terms "equal protection" and "fourteenth amendment," or indeed invoke them all that frequently,
relative to their rhetoric during the civil rights revolution. Congressional references to the Second Amendment started to rise
well in advance of the Supreme Court's 2008 watershed decision in Districtof Columbia v. Heller,14 8 around which time they
skyrocketed. More surprisingly, Democrats were, if anything,
more likely than Republicans to appeal to originalist tropes and
the Tenth Amendment in the mid-twentieth century; 1 4 9 starting in the 1970s, Republicans came to dominate these vocabu148 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
149 Loosely in line with this finding, see FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF
ORIGINALISM 92 (2013) (arguing that while the liberal Warren Court Justices are

"often accused of ignoring the original meaning of the Constitution" during the
1950s and 1960s, in fact "originalism survived and even grew in importance
during the Warren Court era").
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laries. Again, our Online Appendix offers much more detail,
with comparable charts for every single term in the Expansive
dictionary. 1 5 0 The six charts in Figure 15 are revealing in their
own right. They also give a taste of how narrower inquiries can
fill in some of the details of the larger picture of constitutional
polarization painted in Part IV.
VI
POLARIZED DISCOURSE OUTSIDE CONGRESS

A powerful attribute of our principal methodologies is their
flexibility across textual data sets, permitting us to analyze
constitutional polarization in virtually any well-organized
corpus. To provide a basis for comparison with (and a rough
robustness check on) the key results discussed in Part IV, this
Part briefly explores one alternative source of political and constitutional discourse: staff editorials in the New York Times and
the Wall Street Journal. As described in Part II,151 we used
ProQuest and Factiva to collect 57,884 editorials published
from 1993 to November 2018. For years prior to 1993, both
databases are missing the full text of editorials for one or both
sources, especially the Journal. We therefore cabin the analysis below to the 46,242 full-text editorials from 1993 to 2018.
TABLE

2: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF NEWSPAPER EDITORIALS CORPUS
Total Number of
Ea
NYT
WSJ
Overall

Average Number of
Editorials per Year
(Standard Deviation)
W8J
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Figure 16 reproduces the analysis behind Figure 3 for our
newspaper editorials corpus. As in Figure 3, Figure 16 depicts
the relative frequency of "constitutional" documents in this
Pozen, Talley & Nyarko, Online App., supranote 5, at fig. OA.3.
See supra note 66 and accompanying text. Data restrictions on the availa151
bility of Journal editorials prior to 1993 unfortunately prevented us from extending the analysis further back in time.
150
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corpus, using four different tests of what counts as a constitutional document. The overall shares of newspaper editorials
that have constitutional subject matter are substantially
higher than the comparable figures for congressional floor remarks, and there is a weak upward trend in these shares,
particularly evident during the Obama and Trump
Administrations.
FIGURE

16: SHARE OF "CONSTTUTIONAL" EDITORIALS (BY YEAR)
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Figure 17 reproduces the analyses behind Figures 4 and
5-our baseline results-for our newspaper editorials corpus.
As in Figures 4 and 5, Figure 17 shows the evolution of ideological polarization, as measured by our three core metrics of
classifier performance, for constitutional versus nonconstitutional documents. Our adaptation here is to identify "speaker"
and "ideology" with publication outlet, with the Journal proxying for "conservative" speakers and the Times proxying for "liberal" speakers. To facilitate comparisons between these results
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and the Congressional Record results, we lump the editorials
into two-year bins corresponding to the contemporaneous Congresses. All panels use the Minimal dictionary and a cutoff
criterion of 0 to impute constitutional subject matter. The average length of constitutional editorials in our data set is 569
words, while the average length of nonconstitutional editorials
is 503 words. Because this difference is relatively small and
the number of editorials is relatively modest, we do not match
editorials by length.
FIGURE 17: PREDICTING PUBLICATION OUTLET BY TEXTUAL CONTENT
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As all three panels of Figure 17 show, both constitutional
and nonconstitutional editorials in the Journaland Times grew
increasingly polarized over the past twenty-five years, but not
always at the same rate. After starting out being substantially
less polarized in the early 1990s, constitutional editorials had
largely caught up with nonconstitutional editorials by the
2000s. Levels of constitutional polarization surged again dur-
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ing the second term of the Obama Administration and the first
two years of the Trump presidency.
We interpret these findings as suggestive though secondary to our findings on Congress. The temporal span of this
corpus is much briefer than that of the Congressional Record,
and the data set is much less rich in content. Moreover, there
is no simple way to control for different style guides that the
Journaland the Times may be using at any given time. Nevertheless, it is notable that a similar pattern of growing constitutional polarization appears in this corpus as well. Additional
research into the path of polarization in these newspapers,
along with any number of other newspapers and media
sources, seems well warranted.
CONCLUSION: A COMPUTATIONAL AGENDA FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
SCHOLARSHIP

This Article is the first to use computational techniques to
investigate the ideological and partisan structure of constitutional discourse outside the courts. Applying these techniques
to millions of remarks made on the House and Senate floors as
well as tens of thousands of newspaper editorials, we are able
to demonstrate the explosive growth of constitutional polarization over the past four decades and to shed new empirical light
on its causes, contours, and implications for the separation of
powers. If the fact that Democrats and Republicans "increasingly speak different languages . . . contribute[s] to the striking
increase in inter-party hostility evident in recent years"' 5 2 and
to the prejudices associated with "partyism,"15 3 our findings
suggest that appeals to the Constitution are unlikely to offer
refuge. If anything, constitutionalizing policy debates appears
to make matters worse. We hope these findings will inform and
inspire further research on constitutional polarization by
scholars from diverse disciplines.
More than that, we hope this Article will inform and inspire
computational inquiries into a wide array of constitutional subjects. This inquiry has focused on constitutional polarization
in the postwar period. Our data and our methods, however,
152
Gentzkow, Shapiro & Taddy, supra note 9, at 26 (citing Shanto Iyengar,
Gaurav Sood & Yphtach Lelkes, Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective

on Polarization, 76 PUB. OPINION Q. 405 (2012)).
153 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Partyism, 2015 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 1, 1-8

(defining partyism as hostility "to the opposing party and willing[ness] to believe
that its members have a host of bad characteristics" and reviewing evidence of its

emergence in the United States).
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could fruitfully be employed to investigate a virtually limitless

number of questions involving constitutional discourse and its
evolution over time-from the significance of speakers' sex,
age, race, educational background (in law or otherwise), tenure
in office, and proximity to their next election; to the deliberative
effects of various procedural rules or of iterated exchanges with
members of another political party; to the relationship between
rates of constitutional rhetoric and congressional productivity;
to the changing nature of constitutional argumentation during
periods of military conflict, political violence, major statutory
reform (including the passage of quasi-constitutional "superstatutes"),1 5 4 Supreme Court confirmation hearings, or formal
constitutional amendment. Recent constitutional scholarship,
moreover, suggests any number of specific hypotheses that
might be tested with comparable data and methods-from Joseph Fishkin and William Forbath's claim that following the
New Deal, the United States experienced "the disappearance of
the discourse of constitutional political economy," in which issues of economic opportunity had been broadly understood
and debated in constitutional terms; 1 5 5 to Aziz Rana's claim
that the culture of "constitutional veneration" is a relatively
recent phenomenon bound up with the Cold War effort to justify American imperial ambitions; 15 6 to Jamal Greene's claim
that interpreters tend to resolve debates over "constitutional
rules" with reference to originalist sources, but to resolve debates over "constitutional standards" with reference to nonoriginalist sources; 15 7 to the suggestion in multiple works
that conservative constitutional rhetoric has become more
154
See generallyWilliam N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50
DUKE L.J. 1215 (2001).
155 Joseph Fishkin & William Forbath, Reclaiming ConstitutionalPoliticalEconomy: An Introduction to the Sympostum on the Constitutionand Economic Inequality, 94 TEx. L. REV. 1287, 1294 (2016). Fishkin and Forbath describe this
development as "the 'great forgetting.'" Id.
156 Aziz Rana, Making American Constitutional Consensus 2 (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on fie with authors); see also Asli Bill & Aziz Rana, Constitutionalism and the American Imperial Imagination, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 257, 264
(2018) (calling attention to "the manner in which [Cold War] constitutionalism
creatively married notions of universal inclusion and self-government with racial
hierarchies about global stewardship").
157 Jamal Greene, Rule Originalism, 116 CoLUM. L. REv. 1639 (2016). Also
potentially testable through computational methods is the broader claim, made
by many, that conservatives tend to prefer relatively clear legal rules whereas
liberals tend to prefer relatively open-ended legal standards. See, e.g., Spencer
Overton, Rules, Standards,and Bush v. Gore: Form and the Law ofDemocracy, 37
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 82 (2002) ("Liberals are said to favor standards,
whereas conservatives are said to favor rules."); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreworc- The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
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15
likely than its liberal counterpart to evoke fearful sentimentss
and to emphasize necessitarian arguments about the Constitution's "real" or "true" meaning rather than explicitly normative
arguments sounding in policy or political morality. 1 5 9
This list only begins to scratch the surface. But that is our
point. At least where large textual data sets such as the Congressional Record are available and germane, the study of almost any aspect of constitutional discourse and discord stands
to benefit from computational analysis of the sort this Article
has undertaken.

HARV. L. REv. 22, 96 (1992) (discussing "the stereotype that rules are conservative
and standards liberal").
158 See, e.g., Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 24, at 971 ("Constitutional narra-

tives of debasement and restoration are consonant with a broader type of narrative in contemporary conservative politics: a story that something has gone
fundamentally awry in the republic, on the order of an existential crisis, and that
unpatriotic liberals have allowed or caused it to happen."). For an overview of
"sentiment analysis" in computational linguistics and an application to public
comments received by U.S. administrative agencies, see Michael A. Livermore,
Vladimir Eidelman & Brian Grom, ComputationallyAssisted Regulatory Participation, 93 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 977, 1003-14 (2018).
159 See, e.g., William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
2349, 2351 (2015) ("Originalists rely on an intuition that the original meaning of a
document is its real meaning and that anything else is making it up."); Pozen,

supra note 26, at 936-39 (contrasting the arguments advanced by "living constitutionalists" with certain originalists' "claim to a prepolitical, ontologically or con-

ceptually required methodology").
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APPENDIX A: CONSTITUTIONAL DICTIONARIES

Subpart III.A explained and defended our decision to use
constitutional dictionaries as a basis for distinguishing "constitutional" from "nonconstitutional" subject matter. Parts IV, V,
and VI demonstrated the ability of a dictionary-based approach, when combined with machine learning, to illuminate
the contours of constitutional polarization. This Appendix reproduces the contents of the five dictionaries we have created,
along with an explanation of some of the contestable choices
that (inevitably) informed their construction.
We note that although we have discussed the four larger
dictionaries with a range of colleagues, it certainly remains
possible that each could be improved by adding or subtracting
specific terms. Doing so is extremely unlikely to affect our
main results-and by design is incapable of affecting our baseline results, which rely on the Minimal dictionary only. But we
welcome future efforts to refine these dictionaries if improvements can be identified and justified on reasonably objective
grounds.
A.

Minimal Dictionary

The Minimal dictionary, recall, is limited to the term "constitution" and all variants and stems thereof. 16 0 Variants of
"constitution" such as "constitutional," "unconstitutional,"
"nonconstitutional," "extraconstitutional," "constitutionally,"
and "unconstitutionally" are included. Variants of "constitute"
are excluded. Our preprocessing of the textual data renders
capitalization and punctuation irrelevant.1 6 1 Accordingly, the
Minimal dictionary consists of all variants of:
constitution
B.

Textual Dictionary

The Textual dictionary includes the Minimal dictionary
and, in addition, the titles of all constitutional articles, amendments, and clauses, both in their standard legal formulations
and in well-recognized colloquial synonyms. Along with rendering capitalization and punctuation irrelevant, our stemming
process guarantees that we identify each term in all of our
dictionaries regardless of whether the term (or any distinct
words within the term) appears in its singular or plural form.
For terms including Arabic numbers, we also scan for alterna160
161

See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
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tive spellings and combine the counts. The entry for "1st
amendment" below thus stands in for "first amendment" and
"Ist amendment" as well as "1st amendment."
The titles of constitutional clauses were culled from a variety of sources, principally Cornell Law School's Legal Informa16 3
tion Institute,1 6 2 The Heritage Guide to the Constitution, The
5
U.S. Constitution On-Line,164 and Wikipedia.16 Any reference
to a constitutional clause in any of these sources is included.
Also included are a number of "powers" that are allocated by
the Constitution to specific actors (for example, the "pardon
power") and tend to be invoked as metonyms for specific
clauses. The term "preamble," however, is excluded on account of how frequently it is invoked in the Congressional Record in connection with pending bills and resolutions rather
than in connection with the Constitution.
In addition to the contents of the Minimal dictionary, the
Textual dictionary contains:
10th amendment
11th amendment
12th amendment
13th amendment
14th amendment
15th amendment
16th amendment
17th amendment
1808 clause
18th amendment
19th amendment
1st amendment
20th amendment
21st amendment
22nd amendment
23rd amendment
24th amendment

25th amendment
26th amendment
27th amendment
2nd amendment
3/5 clause
3rd amendment
4th amendment
5th amendment
6th amendment
7th amendment
8th amendment
9th amendment
admission clause
advice and consent clause
appellatejurisdiction clause
appointment clause
appointmentpower

162
Constitutional Clauses, CORNELL LAW SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST., https://
www.law.cornell.edu/wex/constitutional_clauses [https://perma.cc/8UHW7A89] (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).
163
The Heritage Guide to the Constitution, HERITAGE FOUND., https://
www.heritage.org/constitution [https://perma.cc/B7JF-Y5DP] (last visited Jan.
19, 2019). Upon clicking on any given article or amendment on the left-hand side
of the page, a list of clauses contained within that article or amendment appears
on the right-hand side.
164
Popular Names of Sections and Clauses, U.S. CONST. ON-LINE, https://
www.usconstitution.net/constpop.html [https://perma.cc/UGQ2-W9RG] (last
visited Jan. 19, 2019).
List of Clauses of the United States Constitution, WIKIPEDIA, https://
165
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List-of clausesoftheUnitedStatesConstitution
[https://perma.cc/37M2-C7NW] (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).
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appropriationclause
arising clause
army clause
arraignmentclause
articlefive
articlefour
article one
article seven
article six
article three
article two
assistance-of-counselclause
attestationclause
bankruptcy clause
basket clause
bear arms amendment
bill of rights
borrowing clause
capture clause
case or controversy clause
census clause
citizenship clause
civil war amendments
coefficient clause
coinage clause
comity clause
commander-in-chiefclause
commerce clause
commerce power
compact clause
compensation clause
compulsory process clause
confrontationclause
congressionalenforcement clause
contract clause
copyright and patent clause
copyright clause
cruel and unusual punishment
clause
declaration-of-warclause
declare war clause
define and punish clause
disestablishmentclause
diversity clause
diversity-of-citizenship clause
dormant commerce clause
doublejeopardy clause
due process clause
elastic clause
emoluments clause
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enclave clause
enforcement clause
enumeration clause
equal protection clause
establishmentclause
exception clause
excessive bail clause
excessive fines clause
export clause
export taxation clause
extradition clause
faithful execution clause
faithfully executed clause
foreign commerce clause
free assembly clause
free exercise clause
free press clause
free speech clause
freedom of assembly clause
freedom of religion clause
freedom of speech clause
freedom of the press clause
fugitive slave clause
full faith and credit clause
general welfare clause
good behavior clause
grandjury clause
guaranteeclause
guaranty clause
impartialjury clause
impeachment clause
impeachment power
implied powers clause
import/export clause
income tax amendment
incompatibility clause
indian commerce clause
ineligibility clause
inferior officer clause
information clause
interstatecommerce clause
interstate renditionclause
journal clause
judicial compensation clause
just compensation clause
land grantjurisdiction clause
liberty clause
loyalty clause
meetings of congress clause
migrationor importation clause
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reserve clause
militia clause
revenue clause
naturalizationclause
right to bear arms amendment
navy clause
right-to-counsel clause
necessary and properclause
rules and expulsion clause
new states clause
oath-of-office clause
search and seizure clause
oath clause
self-incriminationclause
opinion clause
sinecure clause
orders, resolutions, and votes
slavery amendment
clause
speech and debate clause
originaljurisdictionclause
speech or debate clause
originationclause
speedy trialclause
pardon clause
spending clause
pardon power
spending power
pardon power clause
statement and account clause
patent and copyright clause
subscriptionclause
petition clause
supremacy clause
port preference clause
suspension clause
postal clause
sweeping clause
postal power clause
take care clause
power of impeachment
takings clause
power of the purse
taxing and spending clause
power to tax
taxing and spending power
power-of-the-purse clause
taxing power
power-to-tax-clause
territorialclause
presentment clause
title of nobility clause
presidentialeligibility clause
tonnage clause
presidentialsuccession clause
treason clause
privileges and immunities clause
treaty clause
privileges or immunities clause
treaty power
prohibition amendment
treaty-making power
property clause
trial by jury clause
public trial clause
trial-by-jury clause
qualifications clause
uniformity clause
ratificationclause
vacancies clause
reception clause
vesting clause
recess appointment clause
veto power
recess appointment power
vicinage clause
recommendations clause
war clause
reconstruction amendments
war power clause
reexaminationclause
warrant clause
republicanform clause
womens suffrage amendment
clause
republican-form-of-government

C.

Extended Textual Dictionary

The Extended Textual dictionary includes the Minimal and
Textual dictionaries and, in addition, dozens of familiar
phrases that appear in the text of the Constitution and lack a
common extraconstitutional usage. The selection of these
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phrases is inherently subjective. On the one hand, we opted to
exclude phrases such as "state of the union" and "general welfare" that appear to have crossed over to a significant degree
into the extraconstitutional realm, in the sense that their invocation does not reliably conjure up the Constitution for speakers or listeners. On the other hand, we opted to include certain
textual phrases, such as "executive power," that arguably
share this same problem (although to a lesser degree, in our
estimation). We also exclude all institutions created by the
Constitution, such as the Electoral College and the Senate, as
these institutions are routinely invoked in political commentary without any apparent intent or effect of making a constitutional claim.
In addition to the contents of the Minimal and Textual
dictionaries, the Extended Textual dictionary contains:
advice and consent
aid and comfort
among the several states
appellatejurisdiction
assistance of counsel
bear arms
bill of attainder
blessings of liberty
commander-in-chief
cruel and unusual punishment
direct taxes
domestic tranquility
due process
emoluments
equal protection
establishment of religion
ex post facto
excessive bail
excessive fines
executive power
faithfully executed
free exercise
freedom of speech
full faith and credit
habeas corpus
high crimes and misdemeanors
impartialjury
inferior courts
inferior officers
involuntary servitude
judicial power
just compensation

lay and collect taxes
legislativepowers
letters of marque and reprisal
life liberty or property
more perfect union
natural-borncitizen
necessary and proper
oath or affirmation
obligationof contracts
office of profit or trust
originaljurisdiction
peaceably to assemble
privileges and immunities
privileges or immunities
progress of science and useful arts
provide and maintain a navy
providefor the common defense
public trial
raise and support armies
regulate commerce
religious test
republicanform of government
reserved to the states
retained by the people
right to be confronted
rule of naturalization
rules of its proceedings
searches and seizures
shall take care
title of nobility
we the people
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Originalism Dictionary

Unlike the Textual, Extended Textual, and Expansive dictionaries, the Originalism dictionary does not build on the
others but rather was created specifically to investigate the
evolution of "originalist" rhetoric. It is therefore devoted to
terms related to the constitutional founding and the Constitution's original meaning. The construction of this list, too, is
inherently subjective. For instance, we opted to exclude the
names of specific framers, as even a cursory perusal of the
Congressional Record shows the risk of false positives to be
extremely high. (There are dozens of schools and other institutions that have "George Washington" in their names.) However,
we opted to include "textualism" on account of its close conceptual affinity with "originalism," even though the term may refer
to a theory of statutory as well as constitutional interpretation.
The Originalism dictionary contains:
3/5 compromise
anti-federalist
articles of confederation
committee of detail
constitutional convention
continental congress
declarationof independence
federal convention
federalist
founders
founding fathers
framers

E.

original intention
original meaning
originalpublic meaning
original understanding
originalism
originalist
philadelphiaconvention
strict construction
strict constructionism
textualism
textualist

Expansive Dictionary

Finally, the Expansive dictionary includes all four of the
preceding dictionaries and, in addition, over 100 important
constitutional concepts that are at least several decades old.
We impose this age requirement to avoid extreme presentism in
results that make use of this dictionary. The construction of
this dictionary is especially subjective. We derived its contents
from the indices of three leading constitutional law
casebooks,1 6 6 as well as a "constitutional glossary" created for
students by the Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania.' 6 7
166
PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND
MATERIALS (7th ed. 2018); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (5th ed. 2017);
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (19th ed. 2016).
167
Donald A. Ritchie & Justice Learning.org, Our Constitution: Constitutional

Glossary, ANNENBERG PUB. POL'Y CTR. (2017), https://www.annenbergclassroom.
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In general, we aimed to construct this dictionary in an
encompassing fashion, sweeping in numerous terms whose
"constitutional-ness" might be debated, on the view that overinclusiveness is preferable to underinclusiveness for purposes
of a catch-all, final dictionary. Yet at the risk of losing some
potentially interesting information, we decided against using
case names (as well as institutions) in this dictionary because
of their inherent time-boundedness. No one could invoke "Roe
v. Wade," for instance, before the eponymous lawsuit was filed
in 1970. For a similar reason, we exclude terms such as "commandeering," "undue burden," and "congruence and proportionality" that did not appear in constitutional discourse until
they were introduced by the Court in recent cases. 168
In addition to the contents of the Minimal, Textual, Extended Textual, and Originalism dictionaries, the Expansive
dictionary contains:
abortion right
access to court
activist court
activistjudge
administrative state
advisory opinion
affirmative action
alienagediscrimination
anti-discrimination
apportionment
badges and incidents
bicameralism
birthrightcitizenship
case or controversy
checks and balances
civil liberties
civil rights
class legislation
clear-and-presentdanger
colorblindness
compelled speech
concurrentpowers
conditional spending
congressional enforcement
congressionalpower

countermajoritarian
court packing
court stripping
delegation of power
democratic legitimacy
departmentalism
desegregation
dilution of votes
discrete-and-insular
disenfranchisement
disparateimpact
disparatetreatment
doublejeopardy
economic liberty
economic right
emergency power
eminent domain
enumerated power
enumerated right
equalfooting
equal rights
equality
executive detention
executive privilege
faithful execution

org/resource/our-constitution/our-constitution-glossary

[https://perma.cc/

Q4JA-5N4F].
168
See generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (congruence
and proportionality); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(undue burden); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)
(commandeering).
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federal government power
federaljurisdiction
federal power
federalism
flag burning
free press
free speech
freedom of assembly
freedom of association
freedom of contract
freedom of expression
freedom of petition
freedom of religion
freedom of the press
findamentalfairness
fundamental interest
fundamental right
gay rights
gender discrimination
gender equality
heightened scrutiny
historical gloss
implied power
incorporatedrights
indefinite detention
individual right
inherent powers
intermediate scrutiny
interposition
interstate compact
judicial activism
judicialdeference
judicial immunity
judicial review
judicial supremacy
jurisdictionstripping
jury trial

justiciable
legislative immunity
legislative veto
liberty
life tenure
lifetime tenure
line-item veto
malapportionment
minimum rationality
national-origindiscrimination
negative right
neutral principles
nondelegation

nonjusticiable
nullification
oath of office
obscenity
official discrimination
one-person-one-vote
overbreadth
packing the court
plenary power
pocket veto
police power
political expression
political question
political speech
poll tax
popular sovereignty
positive right
preemption
presidentialeligibility
presidentialinmunity
presidentialpower
presidentialprivilege
presidentialsuccession
pressfreedom
prior restraint
property right
public forum
race discrimination
race equality
race-based discrimination
racial discrimination
racial equality
racial gerrymandering
racial integration
racialprofiling
racial redistricting
racially discriminatory
rational basis review
rational basis test
rationality review
reapportionment
reconstructionpowers
religiousfreedom
removal power
reproductive rights
reverse discrimination
reverse incorporation
right of abortion
right of free speech
right of petition
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right of privacy
right of self-defense
right to abortion
right to confront
right to counsel
right to education
right to free speech
right to petition
right to privacy
right to self-defense
right to travel
right to vote
segregation
self-defense right
self-incrimination
separate-but-equal
separationof church and state
separationof powers
sex discrimination
sex equality
sex-based discrimination
sexual equality
sexual orientation equality
sexual-orientationdiscrimination

signing statement
sovereign immunity
speedy trial
stare decisis
state action
state discrimination
state sovereignty
states rights
strict scrutiny
suffrage
suspect class
suspect classification
takings
time place and manner
trial by jury
unenumerated right
unitary executive
void for vagueness
vote dilution
voting right
wall of separation
war power
warrant requirement
womens equality
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B: REGRESSION RESULTS

This Appendix describes results from several regression
analyses referenced in Part V's exploration of possible drivers of
constitutional polarization.
Table B. 1 contains a kinked regression specification accompanying the results described in subpart V.A (and the
lower panel of Figure 10) regarding asymmetric constitutional
polarization. The table uses "constitutional" documents that
trigger the Minimal dictionary and estimates the relationship
between the measured partisanship of these documents (per
our classifier) and various nontext attributes. In particular, we
estimate the relationship:
y= a + 1 - (PR Score) + 62 - (Late Period) +3 - (Conservative)
+P4- (PR Score) x (Late Period) + ,s - (PR Score) x (Conservative)
+6 - (Late Period) x (Conservative)
+P7 - (PR Score) x (Late Period) x (Conservative) + (1,

(B 1)

where yi denotes our classifier's probability assessment that a
given speaker is conservative; (PR Score) is dimension one of
the speaker's Poole-Rosenthal (PR) score based on roll-call
votes; (Late Perioc) is an indicator variable set to 1 if the remark occurs during the later period (1999-2016) from Figure
10; (Conservative) is an indicator variable set to 1 if the
speaker's voting record is conservative (also according to PR
scores); and j is an error term.
Not surprisingly, the intensity of the speaker's PR Score (as
reflected in the estimate for /i) strongly predicts the classifier's
confidence in assessing her speech. The main coefficient of
interest, however, is the regression "kink" coefficient 87, whose
strong positive estimates imply that in the late period partisanship increased significantly among ideologically extreme conservatives. Although all estimated effects are statistically
significant owing to the large sample size, the sheer magnitude
of the estimated kink coefficient is particularly striking,
swamping even the predictive magnitude of the unconditional
PR Score.
Table B.2 provides regression estimates of the extent to
which being "out of power" predicts a greater proclivity to invoke the Constitution, tracking the panels of Figure 11. We
calculate total counts of constitutional remarks made by Democrats and Republicans each year, and thus all specifications
in the table estimate a negative binomial regression with an
offset parameter (not reported) equal to the total number of
remarks made by members of the party in the observed year.
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The four subpanels of the table utilize four different imputation
protocols for deeming a remark to be constitutional. For each
protocol, we also estimate the relationship for different eras
(pre-1940, 1940-1979, 1980-2016). The top panel uses a
maximum-likelihood approach with negative binomial functional form to estimate implicitly the hazard-rate relationship:
p, = a + fP

.

(NonAlliedto) +

P2

-

(Republicant) + 63 - (Houseof Repst) + 4

t.

(B2)

where p4t represents the hazard rate governing a negative binomial distribution function for party i (Democrats, Republicans)
at time t. The key indicator variable (NonAlliedt) takes on the
value of 1 whenever the chamber is not controlled by the same
party as group i (and 0 otherwise). In the bottom panel of the
table, we pool the chambers and redefine (NonAlliec) to take on
the value of 1 if the president is not from the same party as
group i (and 0 otherwise), or:
pt = a + 6, - (NonAlliedt) + 62 - (Republicant) + Co.

(B3)

Note that while both specifications suggest a greater countermajoritarian proclivity to invoke the Constitution (that is, [3 >
0) over the entire panel, the estimated effect appears inconsistent over time. In particular, in the period from 1940 to 1979,
the countermajoritarian use of constitutional rhetoric is dampened (top panel) or slightly reversed (bottom panel) relative to
the other eras.
Finally, Table B.3 augments subpart V.C and Figure 13 to
consider whether the staggered introduction of C-SPAN1 and
C-SPAN2 in the House and Senate, respectively, was related to
greater degrees of discursive polarization (as measured by
CCR). The introduction of the two networks took place approximately seven years apart, allowing us to measure two distinct
"shocks" to each chamber, using the other chamber as a control group. In the left-hand panel, we estimate various permutations of the relationship:
a + 11 - (Senate,) + 62 - (Post-CSPAN Itj + 63 - (Post-CSPAN 2(t)
04 - (Senatet) x (Post-CSPAN let) x (Post-CSPAN2 4t) + 4 t,

+

y=

where yet denotes our text classifier's probability assessment
that speaker i who gives a speech at time t is conservative;
(Senatet) is an indicator variable set to 1 if the speaker is a
senator at the time the speech is delivered; and (Post-CSPAN
lt) and (Post-CSPAN2Lt are indicator variables set to 1 if the
speech is given after the introduction of C-SPAN1 and CSPAN2, respectively. The first three columns of Table B.3 do
not include "fixed effects" for the speaker; such fixed effects are
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introduced in the final three columns. In columns 1, 2, 4, and
5, where we track only one event, we use a three-year window
around that event. In columns 3 and 6 where we track two
events, we use a window beginning three years before the introduction of C-SPAN1 and ending three years after the introduction of C-SPAN2.
Beginning with the left-hand columns of Table B.3, the two
coefficients of interest are on the cross-product terms, P4 and
a5 . Here, the estimated coefficients cohere with the hypothesis
that constitutional discourse became more polarized in each
chamber following the introduction of cable television coverage.
Remarks in the House became more polarized than in the Senate (,64 < 0) after the introduction of C-SPAN1; and Senate remarks did the same (relative to the House) after the
introduction of C-SPAN2 (8s > 0). That said, note that introducing speaker fixed effects tends to wash away the C-SPAN effect.
This result causes us to temper our assessment that cable
television coverage contributed to polarization in a causal
fashion.
On the other hand, there are aspects of our approach that
are not particularly conducive to a speaker fixed-effects estimation. For example, certain members of Congress, particularly
in the House, do not survive across both measurement periods.
Moreover, the reasons for their nonsurvival (through retirement or failed reelection bid) are plausibly related to unflattering appearances on C-SPAN. All told, we view the results in
Table B.3 as being supportive, but not definitively so, of a CSPAN effect in legislators' constitutional speech.
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